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Abstract 
We present a static model of aggregate demand and unemployment. The economy has a nonproduced 
good, a produced good, and labor. Product and labor markets have matching frictions. A general 
equilibrium is a set of prices, market tightnesses, and quantities such that buyers and sellers optimize 
given prices and tightnesses, and actual tightnesses equal posted tightnesses. In each frictional market, 
there is one more variable than equilibrium condition. To close the model, we take all prices as 
parameters. We obtain the following results: (1) unemployment and unsold production prevail in 
equilibrium; (2) each market can be slack, efficient, or tight if the price is too high, efficient, or too 
low; (3) product market tightness and sales are positively correlated under aggregate demand shocks 
but negatively correlated under aggregate supply shocks; (4) transfers from savers to spenders 
stimulate aggregate demand, product market tightness, and employment; (5) the government-purchase 
multiplier is positive when the economy is slack, zero when the economy is efficient, and negative 
when the economy is tight; (6) with unequal distribution of profits and labor income, a wage increase 
may stimulate aggregate demand and reduce unemployment. 
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1 Introduction
There is a view that fluctuations in aggregate demand explain some of the fluctuations in unemploy-
ment observed over the business cycle. However, the standard theory of unemployment—the match-
ing theory developed by Diamond [1982], Mortensen [1982], and Pissarides [1985]—only accounts
for fluctuations caused by changes in wages, matching process, production technology, or policy. In
this paper we propose a model that builds on matching theory and that accounts for the influence of
aggregate demand on unemployment.
The model is static. There are three goods in the economy: a nonproduced good, a produced
good, and labor. The market for nonproduced good is perfectly competitive but the product and labor
markets have matching frictions. Matching frictions have two components: a matching function,
which governs the number of trades on the market, and a matching cost, incurred by each buyer and
measured in terms of the traded good.1 From a seller’s perspective, a frictional market looks like
a competitive market except that she must take into account not only the market price but also the
probability to sell, which is less than one. From a buyer’s perspective, a frictional market looks like a
competitive market except that she must take into account the effective price of consumption, which
is the market price times a wedge that captures the cost of matching. We define a market tightness
for each frictional market. The market tightness determines the selling probability and the matching
wedge. A general equilibrium is a set of prices, market tightnesses, and quantities such that buyers
and sellers optimize given prices and tightnesses, and actual tightnesses equal posted tightnesses. In
each frictional market, there is one more variable than equilibrium condition. This property implies
that many combinations of prices and tightnesses are consistent with general equilibrium. To close
the model, we take all prices as parameters. Nonetheless, the equilibrium is pairwise Pareto efficient
in the sense that once a match is realized, there is no price change that could benefit both seller and
buyer. Since prices are parameters, only tightnesses equilibrate the markets with matching frictions.
The model has three critical elements: nonproduced good, matching frictions, and parametric
prices. The nonproduced good is necessary to obtain an interesting concept of aggregate because
without it, consumers would mechanically spend all their income on produced good. In our model
consumers allocate their income between consumptions of produced and nonproduced good, and
1By introducing these two components, we follow the common approach to modeling matching frictions. The match-
ing function is a well-behaved function that summarizes the complicated exchange process between buyers an sellers. See
Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001] and Rogerson, Shimer and Wright [2005] for discussions of the theoretical foundations
and empirical characterization of the matching function. The matching cost is usually measured in terms of nume´raire,
but measuring it in terms of traded goods simplifies the exposition and welfare analysis. Farmer [2008, 2009] and Shimer
[2010] make the same modeling choice.
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aggregate demand is the desired consumption of produced good. Matching frictions generate un-
sold production in equilibrium to propagate aggregate demand shocks to the labor market, generate
unemployment in equilibrium, and provide a theoretical justification for price and wage rigidity in
equilibrium. Last, the parametric prices allow aggregate demand and other shocks to affect aggre-
gate demand and labor demand and to have macroeconomic effects. The reason is that the prices
do not respond to shocks, as in the Keynesian tradition. Modeling prices as parameters simplifies the
mechanics of the model while describing the short-run reasonably well as long as prices adjust slowly.
Our model is parsimonious, even when we introduce heterogeneity in preferences, wealth, labor
income, or profit income. The partial equilibrium on each market is represented by the intersection
of a demand curve and supply curve in a (quantity, tightness) plane. It is easy to solve for the general
equilibrium and obtain comparative statics since product market tightness and labor market tightness
solve a simple system of two equations. It is also easy to analyse and represent welfare. We define a
market as slack, efficient, or tight when market tightness is below, at, or above the efficient level of
tightness. In a slack market, consumption and sales—the sum of consumption and aggregate matching
costs—are too low. In a tight market, consumption is too low but sales are too high. When the market
is tight, too much of the traded good is dissipated as matching cost. Each market is slack, efficient, or
tight when the exogenous price is too high, efficient, or too low.
In Section 2, we present the simplest model connecting aggregate demand to unemployment. This
model represents an economy of self-employed workers who sell and purchase services on a market
with matching frictions. Labor and the produced good are a single good so that labor and product mar-
kets are a single market. Because of the matching frictions, workers cannot sell all their services and
are idle part of the time. The rate of idleness, which we interpret as the unemployment rate, is a nega-
tive function of market tightness. We obtain a number of results. First, we show that market tightness
and sales are positively correlated under aggregate demand shocks but negatively correlated under
aggregate supply shocks. Second, when individuals differ in their marginal propensity to consume,
transfers from savers to spenders stimulate aggregate demand and market tightness. Such transfers
increase aggregate consumption when the economy is slack but reduce it when the economy is tight.
Third, the government-purchase multiplier changes sign across economic regimes: it is positive when
the economy is slack, zero when the economy is efficient, and negative when the economy is tight.
In Section 3, we introduce firms that mediate between workers and consumers by hiring workers
on a labor market with matching frictions, employing these workers to produce goods, and selling the
production on a product market with matching frictions. Following Michaillat [2012], we assume that
firms are large, face a production function with diminishing marginal returns to labor, and maximize
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profits taking labor market tightness and real wage as given. This richer model allows us to study
how aggregate demand shocks propagate from the product market to the labor market and how they
affect unemployment, to study the effects of shocks to technology, labor force participation, and real
wage, and to examine the impact of an unequal distribution of profits and labor income. For instance,
we show that if profits are concentrated among savers while labor income is concentrated among
spenders, a wage increase may reduce unemployment. This happens when the positive effect of the
wage increase on aggregate demand dominates its negative effect on labor demand.
Section 4 argues that our matching framework is not restrictive. Using alternative assumptions
about the functional forms of the utility, production, and matching functions, the value of matching
costs, and the price and wage schedules, our model yields the same first-order conditions as a broad
range of macroeconomic models. When we make assumptions to mimic a perfect-competition model,
a matching model with Nash bargaining over price and wage, and a monopolistic-competition model,
aggregate demand shocks have no effect because the price adjusts sufficiently to absorb them com-
pletely. In contrast in our model, price and wage are rigid and aggregate demand shocks therefore
propagate to product and labor markets. When we make assumptions to mimic a matching model
with rigid price and wage and with linear utility and production functions, many issues related to ag-
gregate demand are trivial because aggregate demand and labor demand functions are perfectly elastic
in tightness. In contrast in our model, utility function and production function are concave so the de-
mand functions are decreasing in tightness. When we make assumptions to mimic a fixprice-fixwage
model, we obtain aggregate demand effects, but the theory is much less tractable because it creates
four different regimes, each with a different set of equilibrium conditions. The four regimes appear
because the matching functions are equal to the minimum of their two arguments so all supply func-
tions have kinks. In contrast in our model, the matching functions are smooth, the kinks disappear,
and the general equilibrium is described by a unique set of equilibrium conditions.
Section 5 concludes by discussing some applications of the model. First, the model could be
used to analyze the impact on unemployment of fiscal policies that affect simultaneously aggregate
demand, labor demand, and labor supply (for example, unemployment insurance, employer and em-
ployee payroll taxes, or minimum wage). Second, empirical research could exploit the theoretical
predictions of the model to identify the macroeconomic shocks driving business cycle fluctuations.
A key result of the analysis is that product market tightness and sales are positively correlated under
aggregate demand shocks but negatively correlated under other shocks. We explain how empirical
research on sales and inventories could use this result to identify macroeconomic shocks. Third, the
model could be a starting point to build a dynamic and stochastic macroeconomic model featuring
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unsold production and unemployment. To obtain a quantitatively realistic model, however, we would
need to introduce a process for price adjustment instead of considering fixed prices only. For instance,
prices might adjust toward the efficient level in the medium run through the competitive search mech-
anism of Moen [1997].
Our model is related to several other models that explore the link between aggregate demand and
equilibrium unemployment.2 Farmer [2008, 2009] exploits the indeterminacy arising in a matching
model of the labor market to select an equilibrium using agents’ beliefs about the level of economic
activity. In Farmer’s models, the wage satisfies an additional condition imposing that agents’ beliefs
are fulfilled in equilibrium. In contrast, in our model, price and wage are parameters. Lehmann and
Van der Linden [2010] build a matching model of the product market and labor market. Money is
required for transactions, giving rise to aggregate demand. In their model, the price is determined by
competitive search and the wage by Nash bargaining so price and wage are completely flexible. In
contrast, in our model, price and wage are parameters so they are rigid in response to macroeconomic
shocks. Rendhal [2012] builds a New Keynesian model with matching frictions in the labor market,
giving rise to unemployment, and a cash-in-advance constraint in the product market, giving rise to
an aggregate demand. Kaplan and Menzio [2013] propose a model with matching frictions on the
labor market and the search frictions of Burdett and Judd [1983] on the product market. Shopping
externalities appear, generating multiple rational-expectation equilibria and self-fulfilling fluctuations
in unemployment. The product markets are represented differently in the models of Rendhal [2012]
and Kaplan and Menzio [2013] and in ours. Thus, aggregate demand shocks propagate differently in
these models: the Euler equation and the zero lower bound play a key role in the model of Rendhal
[2012]; price dispersion is critical in the model of Kaplan and Menzio [2013]; matching frictions and
unsold production are central to our model.
2 A Basic Matching Model
This section presents the simplest model in which aggregate demand influences unemployment. All
workers are self-employed and sell services on a market with matching frictions. Because of the
matching frictions, workers may not be able to sell all their services. Thus, workers may be idle part
2Macroeconomists have recently shown renewed interest for aggregate demand. For example, see Mian and Sufi [2012]
for an empirical investigation of the role of aggregate demand, Lorenzoni [2009] for a model in which news shocks act as
aggregate demand shocks, Eggertsson and Krugman [2012] for a model in which debt deleveraging depresses aggregate
demand, Heathcote and Perri [2012] for a model in which a housing market crash depresses aggregate demand, and Bai,
Rios-Rull and Storesletten [2012] for a model of aggregate demand based on a matching model of the product market.
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of the time in equilibrium. Idleness corresponds to unemployment in this simple model.
2.1 The Model
Market for Services. A measure 1 of identical self-employed workers sell services on a market
with matching frictions. The capacity of each worker is y; that is, a worker would like to sell y units
of services. Workers are also consumers of services, but they cannot consume their own services.
Each consumer visits v workers to purchase their services. The number of trades between consumers
and workers is given by a matching function with constant elasticity of substitution:
s =
(
y−η + v−η
)− 1
η ,
where η determines the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the matching process.3 We impose
η > 0 such that the number of trades is less than aggregate capacity, y, and less than the total number
of visits, v. In each trade, a consumer buys one unit of service from a worker at price p > 0.
We define market tightness as the ratio of visits to capacity: x ≡ v/y. Since the matching function
displays constant returns to scale, market tightness determines the probabilities that one unit of service
is sold and that one visit leads to a purchase. Workers sell each unit of service with probability
f(x) =
s
y
=
(
1 + x−η
)− 1
η , (1)
and each visit leads to a purchase with probability
q(x) =
s
v
= (1 + xη)−
1
η . (2)
The matching probabilities, f(x) and q(x), are always between 0 and 1.4 We abstract from random-
ness at the worker and consumer levels: a worker sells f(x) · y units of services for sure, and a
consumer purchases q(x) · v units of services for sure. We define idleness as the fraction of services
that are available but not sold in equilibrium: u = 1 − f(x). Since f(x) < 1, idleness prevails in
equilibrium. The function f is strictly increasing and the function q is strictly decreasing in x. In
other words, when the market is slacker, a larger fraction of workers’ capacity remains unsold and
3This functional form is borrowed from den Haan, Ramey and Watson [2000].
4With a conventional Cobb-Douglas matching function, s = yη · v1−η , the trading probabilities f(x) and q(x) may be
greater than 1, and the matching function may need to be truncated to obtain probabilities between 0 and 1. This truncation
would complicate the analysis, which is why we use the matching function of den Haan, Ramey and Watson [2000].
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idleness rises while a larger fraction of consumers’ visits results in a purchase.
Market for Nonproduced Good. Consumers trade a nonproduced good on a perfectly competitive
market. Each consumer has an endowment µ > 0 of nonproduced good. We normalize the price of the
nonproduced good to 1 and use the nonproduced good as nume´raire. We introduce an nonproduced
good in the model to avoid Say’s law, the result that the supply of services automatically generates its
own demand. With an nonproduced good that enters workers’ utility function, workers allocate their
income between consumption of services and consumption of nonproduced good as a function of the
relative price of these goods. The optimal allocation then determines aggregate demand.5
Consumers. Consumers have a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function given by
[
χ · c −1 + (1− χ) ·m −1
] 
−1
, (3)
where c is consumption of services,m is consumption of nonproduced good, χ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter
measuring the marginal propensity to consume services out of income, and  is a parameter measuring
the elasticity of substitution between services and nonproduced good. To guarantee existence and
unicity of the equilibrium, we impose  > 1.
The consumer visits v workers to purchase services. Mtching with workers requires other services:
each visit costs ρ ∈ (0, 1) units of services. (For instance, one needs to purchase taxi services to get
to the hair salon and purchase hairdressing services.) The ρ · v units of services for matching are
purchased like the c units of services for consumption. Hence, the number of visits is related to
consumption and market tightness by
q(x) · v = c+ ρ · v.
The desired level of consumption directly determines the number of visits: v = c/ (q(x)− ρ). Be-
cause of the matching cost, consuming one unit of services requires to purchase 1+(ρ·v/c) = 1+τ(x)
units of services, where
τ(x) ≡ ρ
q(x)− ρ.
The function τ is positive and strictly increasing as long as q(x) > ρ, which holds in equilibrium.
5This modeling technique was common in the Keynesian literature of the 1970s and 1980s, when the nonproduced
good was often money. See for instance Barro and Grossman [1971], Hart [1982], or Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987].
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In what follows, we focus on consumption decisions and relegate the matching process to the
background. Consuming c requires purchasing (1+τ(x)) ·c in the course of (1+τ(x)) ·c/q(x) visits,
which costs a total of p · (1 + τ(x)) · c. The matching cost, ρ, imposes a wedge τ(x) on the price of
services. At the limit where ρ is zero, the wedge disappears.
The consumer’s income comes from the sales of µ units of nonproduced good at price 1 and f(x)·y
units of services at price p. The consumer uses the income to purchase m units of nonproduced good
at price 1 and c units of services at price (1 + τ(x)) · p. The consumer’s budget constraint is
m+ (1 + τ(x)) · p · c = µ+ p · f(x) · y. (4)
Given x and p, the consumer chooses m and c to maximize (3) subject to (4). The optimal choice
of consumptions equalizes marginal utility of consumption for c and m given total prices and satisfies
(1− χ) · (1 + τ(x)) · p · c 1 = χ ·m 1 . (5)
The nonproduced good market clears so m = µ. Hence, the optimal consumption choice imposes
c =
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
[(1 + τ(x)) · p] . (6)
At the limit where  → 1, the utility function becomes Cobb-Douglas: cχ · m1−χ. In that case,
the optimal consumption choice (6) can be represented with a Keynesian cross in which the marginal
propensity to consume is χ. The cross is displayed in Figure 1. The first condition in the cross is
E = I: In general equilibrium expenditure on services, E = (1 + τ(x)) · p · c, equal income from the
sales of services, I = p · f(x) · y. The second condition in the cross is E = χ · (µ + I): Consumers
spend on services a fraction χ of their wealth, which is the sum of their labor income, I , and the value
of their endowment, µ. This second condition is obtained by combining (4) with (5) when  = 1.
Hence, in general equilibrium, E = µ · χ/(1− χ), which is equivalent to (6) when  = 1.
2.2 Equilibrium
We now define and characterize the equilibrium of the model.6 We assume that a price, p, and a
market tightness, x, are posted on the market for services, and that buyers and sellers of services
take this price and tightness as given. We define an equilibrium as a triplet (p, x, c) such that the
6Appendix B contains a formal definition of the equilibrium, discusses the assumptions underlying the equilibrium,
and draws a parallel between our equilibrium concept and the Walrasian equilibrium.
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Figure 1: Keynesian cross with Cobb-Douglas utility function
following conditions hold: (1) taking as given x and p, the representative buyer chooses the number
of visits v(x, p) to maximize its utility subject to his budget constraint and to the constraint imposed
by matching frictions: c = v · q(x)/(1 + τ(x)); (2) taking x and p as given, the representative seller
chooses his capacity y(x, p) to maximize its utility subject to the constraint imposed by matching
frictions: s = y · f(x), where s are sales of the seller;7 (3) the actual labor market tightness is
x: v(x, p)/y(x, p) = x; and (4) the price p is pairwise Pareto efficient in all buyer-seller matches.8
Under these equilibrium conditions, the market for nonproduced good necessarily clears.
Our equilibrium concept is a direct extension of the Walrasian equilibrium to a market with match-
ing frictions. As in Walrasian theory, our assumption is that buyers and sellers are small relative to the
size of the market so that they regard market tightness and price as unaffected by their own actions.
In a Walrasian equilibrium, buyers and sellers behave optimally given the quoted price and the expec-
tation that they will be able to trade with probability one. Here, Conditions (1) and (2) impose that
buyers and sellers behave optimally given the quoted price and the quoted market tightness, which
determines the trading probabilities of sellers and buyers. In a Walrasian equilibrium, the market
clears. This condition can be reformulated as a consistency requirement: given that sellers and buyers
expect to be able to trade with probability one, anybody desiring to trade at the quoted price must be
able to trade in equilibrium. This condition can only be fulfilled if at the quoted price the quantity that
buyers desire to buy equals the quantity that sellers desire to sell—that is, if the market clears. Con-
dition (3) is the equivalent to this consistency requirement in presence of matching frictions. Last,
Walrasian theory imposes that no mutually advantageous trades between two agents are available,
7y is exogenous in the single market model of this section but will be endogenous next section.
8In his search-theoretic model of interindustry wage differentials, Montgomery [1991] also defines an equilibrium
concept in which agents take a posted market tightness as given and actual tightness equals posted tightness in equilibrium.
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which in turn imposes that buyers and sellers expect to trade with probability one and not with any
probability below one. This is because without a matching function, buyers who do not trade with
anybody but would like to trade at the current price can come together on the market place. If excess
supply or demand existed at the market price, buyers or sellers could initiate new trades at a different
price until all opportunities for pairwise improvement are exhausted. Condition (4) is the equivalent
of this condition in our theory. However, in presence of matching frictions, the condition that no
mutually advantageous trades are available only applies to agents who are matched. Even though the
equilibrium is pairwise Pareto efficient, the equilibrium might not be Pareto efficient overall in the
sense that changing the price or wage could improve everybody’s welfare.
To obtain a convenient representation of the equilibrium, we define the following functions:
DEFINITION 1. The aggregate demand is a function of market tightness and price defined by
cd(x, p) =
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
[(1 + τ(x)) · p] (7)
for all (x, p) ∈ [0, xm] × (0,+∞), where xm > 0 satisfies ρ = q(xm). The aggregate supply is a
function of market tightness defined for all x ∈ [0, xm] by
cs(x) = (f(x)− ρ · x) · y. (8)
The aggregate demand gives the consumption of services that satisfies the consumer’s optimal
consumption choice given by (6). The aggregate supply gives the amount of services consumed after
the matching process when workers offer y units of services for sale. Lemma 1 establishes a few
properties of aggregate demand and aggregate supply:
LEMMA 1. The function cd is strictly decreasing in x and p, cd(0, p) = [χ/(1− χ)] · [(1− ρ)/p] ·µ,
and cd(xm, p) = 0. The function cs is strictly increasing on [0, x∗], strictly decreasing on [x∗, xm],
cs(0) = 0, cs(xm) = 0, and cs(x∗) = c∗. x∗ maximizes c = [f(x) − ρ · x] · y so that f ′(x∗) = ρ and
c∗ = [f(x∗)− ρ · x∗] · y. The constants x∗ and c∗ depend solely on y, ρ, and η.
The aggregate demand decreases with p and x because when either of them increases, the effective
price of services, (1 + τ(x)) · p, increases and the consumption of services is reduced relative to that
of nonproduced good, fixed to µ. When x is low, the matching process is congested by the amount of
services for sales. Consequently, the additional visits to sellers resulting from an increase in x lead to
a large increase in sales and thus a large increase in f(x). Conversely when x is high, the matching
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process is congested by visits, and the additional visits resulting from the increase in x only lead to
small increases in sales and f(x). It follows that f(x) − ρ · x and the aggregate supply increase for
low x but decrease for high x. The value x = x∗ maximizes f(x)− ρ · x.
Given the definition of aggregate demand, Condition (1) imposes that v(x, p) = (1 + τ(x)) ·
cd(x, p)/q(x). It also imposes that c = cd(x, p). Here there is no active decision from the seller:
each worker’s provision of services is exogenously set to y. Therefore, Condition (2) imposes that
y(x, p) = y. Condition (3) imposes that
x =
v(x, p)
y(x, p)
=
1 + τ(x)
q(x)
· c
d(x, p)
y
.
We rewrite this condition as
cd(x, p) =
x · q(x)
1 + τ(x)
· y = f(x)
1 + τ(x)
· y = cs(x).
Hence, Condition (3) imposes that aggregate supply equals aggregate demand. Condition (4) imposes
that the price p is such that buyer and seller receive a positive surplus from their match. In our model,
this condition is always respected when buyers and sellers behave optimally. The reason is that if
buyers and sellers are willing to trade at price p before the matching process, when the search and
production costs are not yet sunk, they are necessarily willing to trade at price p once they are matched
and the search and production costs are sunk. Accordingly, an equilibrium consists of a triplet (p, x, c)
such that cs(x) = cd(x, p) and c = cs(x).
Since the equilibrium is composed of three variables that satisfy two conditions, there is one more
variable than equilibrium conditions.9 This property implies that infinitely many combinations of
price and tightness are consistent with our equilibrium definition.10 To close the model, we assume
that the price is a parameter of the model and that only market tightness equilibrates the market.11 In
the definition of the equilibrium, the price becomes an exogenous variable; only tightness and quan-
tity are endogenous variables such that the equilibrium is composed of two variables that satisfy two
conditions. Furthermore, the price remains fixed in response to shocks in the comparative-statics anal-
9A Walrasian equilibrium is composed of as many variables as equations because Condition (4) imposes that x is such
that the trading probabilities are one, thus adding one equation to the equilibrium system.
10The property that there is one more variable than equation in matching models was previously noted by Farmer
[2008]. More broadly, the result that there is an indeterminacy in matching models is well known. For instance, Howitt
and McAfee [1987] and Hall [2005] argue the price is indeterminate in matching models because each seller-buyer pair
must share the positive surplus created by their pairing, thus deciding the price in a situation of bilateral monopoly. It has
been known at least since Edgeworth [1881] that the solution to the bilateral monopoly problem is indeterminate.
11To close matching models of the labor market, several researchers assume that the wage is a parameter or a function
of the parameters. See for instance Hall [2005], Blanchard and Galı´ [2010], and Michaillat [2012].
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ysis. This assumption follows the Keynesian tradition. To explain persistent unemployment during
the Great Depression, Keynes [1936] replaced the assumption that the wage clears the labor market
by that of a wage floor under which nominal wages would not fall. This idea was formalized by Hicks
[1965], who developed a model in which prices and wages are fixed and adjustments only take place
through quantity rationing. Barro and Grossman [1971] then introduced the fixprice and fixwage as-
sumptions in a general-equilibrium context. Prices and wages were assumed to be fixed to simplify
the mechanics of the macroeconomy while describing the short-run reasonably well.
Our equilibrium concept does not require to close the model assuming that the price is a parameter.
Any alternative assumption on the price could close the model. However, as showed in Section 4,
readily available assumptions would not allow us to study the effects of aggregate demand shocks.
For instance, the traditional way to close the model is to set prices using the Nash bargaining solution
[Diamond, 1982; Mortensen, 1982]. In Section 4, we show that the Nash bargained price is so flexible
that it completely eliminates the effects of aggregate demand shocks.
We now define and characterize a short-run equilibrium:
DEFINITION 2. Given a price p, a short-run equilibrium consists of a pair (x, c) of market tightness
and consumption such that aggregate supply equals aggregate demand and consumption is given by
the aggregate supply:  c
s(x) = cd(x, p)
c = cd(x, p)
PROPOSITION 1. For any price p > 0, there exits a unique short-run equilibrium with positive
consumption. Equilibrium tightness, x, is the unique solution to
(1 + τ(x))−1 · f(x) · y =
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
. (9)
Equation (9) is obtained by manipulating the equilibrium condition cs(x) = cd(x, p).
Figure 2(a) represents aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and the equilibrium in a (c, x) plane.
The aggregate demand curve slopes downward. The aggregate supply curve slopes upward for x ≤
x∗ and downward for x ≥ x∗. The equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of the two curves
with positive consumption.12 The figure also shows capacity y and sales s = f(x) · y. A fraction
12There is another equilibrium at the other intersection of the curves, but it has zero consumption. Appendix A extends
Proposition 1 to characterize all the possible equilibria, with zero or positive consumption.
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Figure 2: Short-run equilibrium in the model of Section 2
c/s = 1/(1 + τ(x)) of sales are consumed, and a fraction 1 − (c/s) = τ(x)/(1 + τ(x)) of sales
are allocated to matching. The fraction u = 1 − (s/y) = 1 − f(x) of services that are not sold is
idleness. Figure 2(b) represents aggregate demand and aggregate supply in a (c, p) plane. Aggregate
supply does not depend on the price so the aggregate supply curve is vertical. The aggregate demand
curve is downward sloping. The equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of the aggregate supply
and aggregate demand curves in this plane as well.
Even though the matching cost, ρ, plays an important role in the model, idleness would not nec-
essarily disappear if the matching cost were arbitrarily small. What happens when the matching cost
becomes arbitrarily small can be illustrated on Figure 2(a). The aggregate supply curve takes the
shape of the sales curves and the aggregate demand curve becomes vertical and shits outwards. The
equation of the aggregate demand curve when ρ = 0 is cd = [χ/(1− χ)] · µ · p−. Hence, idleness
remains positive in equilibrium if and only if the price is high enough: p > [χ/(1− χ)] · (µ/y)1/.13
Our results do not rely on matching frictions in the product market. It is possible to obtain the
same results through the same mechanism in a model with frictions in the labor market. Assume that
firms hire workers at wage p on a labor market with matching frictions, that each employee produce
one unit of service, and that firms sell services to consumers at price pf on a competitive market.
Consumers purchase any amount of services at price pf from firms, without incurring matching costs.
Firms bear the matching costs. They post v vacancies and fill each vacancy with probability q(x).
Posting a vacancy requires ρ workers so that q(x) · v = c + ρ · v. Hence selling one unit of good
13The labor market model of Michaillat [2012] exhibits the same property. In that model, when the wage is high enough,
some unemployment remains even when the recruiting cost is arbitrarily small.
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requires using 1+(ρ ·v/c) = 1+τ(x) workers. Firms’ profits per sale are equal to pf − (1+τ(x)) ·p,
hence free entry of firms imposes pf = (1 + τ(x)) · p. Workers find a job with probability f(x) and
consumption is c = f(x)/(1 + τ(x)). If the wage, p, is fixed and the price, pf , adjusts, this model is
isomorphic to our initial model, except that sales equal consumption in this new model.
2.3 Efficient Allocation
We now define and describe the efficient allocation, and we characterize the price that implements it:
DEFINITION 3. An efficient allocation is a pair (x, c) of market tightness and consumption that
maximizes welfare,
[
χ · c(−1)/ + (1− χ) · µ(−1)/]/(−1), subject to the matching frictions, c ≤
(f(x)− ρ · x) · y.
PROPOSITION 2. The efficient allocation is (x∗, c∗), where x∗ and c∗ are defined by f ′(x∗) = ρ
and c∗ = [f(x∗)− ρ · x∗] · y. The price that implements the efficient allocation is
p∗ =
χ
1− χ ·
(
µ
y
) 1

·
(
1− ρ η1+η
)1− η+1
η·
.
In Figure 2(b), the efficient allocation is the point that is furthest to the right on the aggregate
supply curve. At this point, the aggregate supply function is maximized. The price p∗ is such that the
aggregate demand curve intersects the aggregate supply curve at the efficient allocation. This price
necessarily exists because by increasing the price from 0 to +∞, the aggregate demand curve rotates
around the point (0, xm) from an horizontal position to a vertical position.
Depending on the value x of equilibrium market tightness, the economy can be in three regimes:
DEFINITION 4. The economy is slack if x < x∗, tight if x > x∗, and efficient if x = x∗.
PROPOSITION 3. The economy is slack if and only if p > p∗, tight if and only if p < p∗, and
efficient if and only if p = p∗.
Figure 3 illustrates the regimes. In the slack regime, the price is above its efficient level so aggre-
gate demand is too low and tightness is below its efficient level. Consumption and sales are below
their efficient level. In the tight regime, the price is below its efficient level so aggregate demand is
too high and tightness is above its efficient level. Consumption is again below its efficient level but
sales are above their efficient level. In our model, higher consumption always implies higher welfare,
which is not the case of higher sales. The economy behaves very differently in the three regimes
13
Quantity of services 
0 
M
ar
ke
t t
ig
ht
ne
ss
 
0 
xm 
c* 
x* 
Slack 
regime 
Aggregate supply 
Aggregate demand 
c 
x 
Sales 
(a) An equilibrium in the slack regime
Quantity of services 
0 
M
ar
ke
t t
ig
ht
ne
ss
 
0 
xm 
c* 
x* 
Efficient 
regime 
Aggregate supply 
Aggregate demand 
Sales 
(b) Equilibrium in the efficient regime
Quantity of services 
0 
M
ar
ke
t t
ig
ht
ne
ss
 
0 
Tight  
regime 
xm 
c* 
x* 
Aggregate supply 
Aggregate demand 
c 
x 
Sales 
(c) An equilibrium in the tight regime
Figure 3: The three regimes of the model of Section 2
because the aggregate supply function has different slopes across regimes: dcs/dx > 0 in the slack
regime; dcs/dx < 0 in the tight regime; and dcs/dx = 0 in the efficient regime.
2.4 Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Shocks
We use comparative statics to describe the response of consumption, market tightness, sales, and
idleness to aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. Table 1 summarizes the results.
We parameterize an aggregate demand shock by a change in marginal propensity to consume, χ, in
price, p, or in endowment, µ. Figure 4(a) illustrates a positive aggregate demand shock, corresponding
to an increase in p or a decrease in χ or µ. The shock leads the aggregate demand curve to rotate
outward and therefore increase market tightness and sales. Since tightness increases, idleness falls.
The impact on consumption depends on the regime: in the slack regime, consumption increases; in
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Figure 4: Effects of aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks in the model of Section 2
the efficient regime, consumption does not change; and in the tight regime, consumption falls. In the
tight regime, a higher tightness reduces the sales devoted to consumption even though it increases
total sales because it increases sharply the sales required for matching.
We parameterize an aggregate supply shock by a change in capacity, y. Figure 4(b) illustrates
a positive aggregate supply shock, corresponding to an increase in y. The shock leads the aggregate
supply curve to expand, raising consumption but reducing market tightness. Since tightness decreases,
idleness increases. Since y increases but x falls, the impact on sales s = f(x) ·y is not obvious. Equa-
tion (9) implies, however, that sales increase as x and therefore (1 + τ(x))−1 fall when y increases.
Interestingly, when the economy is in the efficient regime, shifts in aggregate supply do influence
consumption whereas shifts in aggregate demand have no first-order effects on consumption.
Aggregate supply and aggregate demand shocks generate different correlations between variables.
Market tightness and sales are positively correlated under aggregate demand shocks but negatively
correlated under aggregate supply shocks. An implication is that idleness decreases after a positive
aggregate demand shock but increases after a positive aggregate supply shock. The intuition is simple.
After a positive aggregate demand shock consumers want to consume more services so workers sell a
larger fraction of a fixed amount of services available. Hence, sales and market tightness are higher.
On the other hand, after a positive aggregate supply shock workers offer more services for sale but
consumers do not desire to consume more at a given price, so workers sell a smaller fraction of a
larger amount of services available. Hence, market tightness is lower. Since tightness is lower in
equilibrium, the effective price faced by consumers, (1 + τ(x)) · p, is lower, stimulating consumers to
purchase more services and increasing sales.
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Table 1: Comparative statics in the model of Section 2
Effect on:
Increase in: Market tightness Consumption Sales Idleness
Aggregate demand > 0 > 0 if slack > 0 < 0
= 0 if efficient
< 0 if tight
Aggregate supply < 0 > 0 > 0 > 0
Notes: The comparative statics are derived in Section 2.4. An increase in aggregate demand results from an increase in
endowment, µ, a decrease in price, p, or an increase in marginal propensity to consume, χ. An increase in aggregate
supply results from an increase in capacity, y.
2.5 Transfers
We introduce heterogeneity of preferences and endowment across consumers. Aggregate demand
admits a new expression. Yet, the equilibrium can be represented as in Figure 2. We show that
a transfer of wealth from consumers with low taste for services to consumers with high taste for
services creates a positive aggregate demand shock.
Workers belong to one of G groups of measure 1/G. Group g’s per person utility is
cχgg ·m1−χgg , (10)
where cg is group g’s per person consumption of services, mg is group g’s per person consumption of
nonproduced good, and χg ∈ (0, 1) is group g’s marginal propensity to consume services. We use a
Cobb-Douglas utility function to simplify the exposition.14 Group g’s per person budget is
mg + (1 + τ(x)) · p · cg = µg + p · f(x) · y, (11)
where µg ≥ 0 is group g’s per person endowment of nonproduced good. Workers have the same labor
income in all groups: any worker sells a fraction f(x) of her capacity y at price p.
Given x and p, a consumer in group g chooses cg and mg to maximize (10) subject to (11). The
14Appendix C adapts Proposition 1 to a Cobb-Douglas utility function. An equilibrium with positive consumption
exists if the price is high enough. When the equilibrium exists, equilibrium tightness is the unique solution to (9).
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optimal consumption of services satisfies
(1 + τ(x)) · p · cg = χg · [µg + p · f(x) · y] ,
which is an application of the consumption cross (E = χ · (µ + I)) to a model with heterogeneous
preferences and endowments. We aggregate the demand for services of all the groups:
(1 + τ(x)) · p ·
(∑
g
cg
)
=
(∑
g
µg · χg
)
+
(∑
g
χg
)
· p · f(x) · y.
In general equilibrium, purchases and sales of services are equal: (1 + τ(x)) ·
(∑
g cg
)
/G = f(x) ·y.
Thus, aggregate demand is given by
cd(x, p) ≡ 1
G
·
∑
g
cg =
1
p · (1 + τ(x)) ·
∑
g µg · χg∑
g(1− χg)
.
The level of aggregate demand depends on the joint distribution of (µg, χg) so a transfer of en-
dowment from one group to another affects aggregate demand, consumption, and idleness. Consider
a transfer ∆µ > 0 of endowment from group g with low taste for consumption of services (low χg) to
group g′ with high taste for consumption of services (high χg′). Aggregate demand becomes
cd(x, p) =
1
p · (1 + τ(x)) ·
∆µ · (χg′ − χg) +
∑
g µg · χg∑
g 1− χg
.
Since ∆µ · (χg′ − χg) > 0, the transfer stimulates aggregate demand. Hence, idleness falls and
market tightness and sales increase. The response of aggregate consumption depends on the regime:
aggregate consumption increases if the economy is slack but decreases if the economy is tight.
2.6 Government Purchases
We use comparative statics to describe the response of private and aggregate consumption to an in-
crease in government purchases of services. First, we compute the responses when the government
finances its purchases with an income tax. Next, we compute the responses when the government
finances its purchases by selling part of its endowment of nonproduced good. The responses depend
critically on the regime in which the economy is.
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Government Purchases Financed by an Income Tax. The government consumes g units of ser-
vices financed by an income tax at rate t. The consumer’s budget constraint becomes m + p ·
(1 + τ(x)) · c = µ + (1 − t) · (p · f(x) · y). The government’s budget constraint imposes that
p · (1 + τ(x)) · g = t · (p · f(x) · y). We assume that g enters separately into consumers’ utility
function such that g does not affect their consumption choice. In equilibrium, m = µ. Thus, con-
sumers’ demand for services is given by (7) and the aggregate demand is cd(x, p) + g. The aggregate
supply is given by (8), and the short-run equilibrium (x, c) satisfies c = cd(x, p) and
cs(x) = cd(x, p) + g.
We study the effect of government consumption, g, on total consumption, c + g. We measure
this effect with the balanced-budget multiplier, defined as λBB ≡ 1 + dc/dg. Differentiating the
equilibrium condition with respect to g yields
∂cs
∂x
· ∂x
∂g
=
∂cd
∂x
· ∂x
∂g
+ 1.
Let d ≡ −∂cd/∂x > 0 and s ≡ ∂cs/∂x. By normalization, d > 0. Furthermore, s > 0 in the
slack regime, s = 0 in the efficient regime, and s < 0 in the tight regime. We obtain ∂x/∂g =
1/
(
d + s
)
. Since λBB = (∂cs/∂x) · (∂x/∂g), we obtain
λBB =
1
1 + (d/s)
.
As illustrated on Figure 5, the size of the multiplier depends on the slope of consumers’ demand
relative to the slope of aggregate supply. It follows that the sign and level of the balanced-budget
multiplier depends on the regime in which the economy is. When the economy is slack, s > 0 and
the balanced-budget multiplier is positive but necessarily less than 1. This means that government
consumption increases total consumption but partially crowds out private consumption. Crowding
out arises because after the increase in government purchases, the aggregate demand curve shifts
outward, and market tightness increases to reach the new equilibrium. Therefore, it is more expensive
for consumers to purchase goods: the effective price (1 + τ(x)) · p increases. Consumers reduce
consumption because of the increase in effective price. When the economy is efficient, s = 0 and
the balanced-budget multiplier is 0. This means that government consumption crowds out private
consumption one-for-one. When the economy is tight, s < 0 and |s| < |d| and the balanced-budget
multiplier is negative. This means that government consumption crowds out private consumption
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Figure 5: Balanced-budget multiplier in the three regimes of the model of Section 2
more than one-for-one such that it reduces total consumption.15
When the economy is slack, government purchases bring the economy closer from aggregate
efficiency. This implies that providing more public good than the Samuelson rule—which requires
that marginal utility of private consumption equals marginal utility of public-good consumption—is
desirable when the economy is slack. Conversely, providing less public good than the Samuelson rule
is desirable when the economy is tight. To see this, suppose that utility is given by U = u(c,m)+v(g)
with constraint c+ g = [f(x)− ρ · x]y. The Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision is that
uc(c, µ) = v
′(g). Suppose the Samuelson rule holds and consider a small budget balanced increase
15We compute the multiplier λBB by following the methodology developed in Michaillat [forthcoming] to compute a
public-employment multiplier. While our expression for λBB is quite similar to the expression of the public-employment
multiplier of Michaillat [forthcoming], the multipliers have very different properties: λBB changes sign for different
level of aggregate demand whereas only the amplitude of the public-employment multiplier varies when the level of
labor demand varies (the public-employment multiplier is always positive). The difference arises because λBB is directly
related to welfare whereas the public-employment multiplier is descriptive and not directly linked to welfare.
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dg > 0. We have dU = uc(c, µ)dc + v′(g)dg = v′(g)[dc + dg]. Hence, increasing g above the
Samuelson rule is desirable if and only if dc+ dg > 0, i.e., λBB > 0, i.e., the economy is slack.16
Government Purchases Financed by Selling Nonproduced Good. The government consumes g
units of services financed by the sale of a quantity t of nonproduced good that the government owns.
The consumer’s budget constraint remains given by (4). The government’s budget constraint imposes
that p · (1 + τ(x)) · g = t. The consumer’s and government’s budget constraints, together with
equilibrium on the product market, impose that m = µ+ t = µ+p · (1 + τ(x)) · g in equilibrium. The
consumer’s holding of nonproduced good increases because the government depletes its endowment
of nonproduced good. Furthermore, we assume that government consumption enters separately into
consumers’ utility function such that consumers’ optimal consumption choice remains given by (5).
Since consumers’ income increases, consumers’ demand for services is higher than in the budget-
balanced case, and the aggregate demand becomes
cd(x, p) +
{(
χ
1− χ
)
· [p · (1 + τ(x))]1− + 1
}
· g.
The aggregate supply remains given by (8).
For the rest of the analysis, we assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function ( = 1) to simplify the
analysis. Under this assumption, the short-run equilibrium (x, c) satisfies
cs(x) = cd(x, p) +
1
1− χ · g,
and c = cd(x, p) + g · χ/(1 − χ). We define the deficit-financed multiplier as λDF ≡ 1 + dc/dg.
Proceeding exactly as above, we obtain
λDF =
1
1− χ ·
1
1 + (d/s)
=
1
1− χ · λ
BB.
The deficit-financed multiplier is equal to the budget balanced multiplier times 1/(1−χ) > 1; hence,
the deficit-financed multiplier always has greater amplitude than the balanced-budget multiplier. The
factor 1/(1 − χ) = 1/(1 − marginal propensity to consume) appears under Cobb-Douglas utility
following the same logic as in the textbook Keynesian-cross analysis of the multiplier. Thus, our
model enriches the standard Keynesian-cross analysis of the multipliers with a well-defined concept
16Naturally, altering the Samuelson rule is second-best. A first-best solution to improve an inefficient allocation would
be to change the price p. A complete optimal policy analysis in our model is left for future work.
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of welfare and slack, efficient, and tight regimes.
The multipliers relevant for welfare are those defined in terms of consumption. In contrast, empir-
ical studies typically estimate multipliers defined in terms of GDP, which is the empirical counterpart
to sales.17 These estimates may not be fully informative for welfare analysis because the consumption
and sales multipliers have strikingly different behaviors. For instance with Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion, the consumption multipliers are sharply countercyclical whereas the sales multipliers, denoted
ΛBB and ΛDF , are acyclical: in any regime, ΛBB = 1 and, according to the Keynesian-cross analysis
of the multiplier, ΛDF = 1/(1 − χ).18 An implication is that countercyclical government spending
could be desirable even if multipliers in terms of GDP are estimated to be acyclical.
3 A Matching Model with Product Market and Labor Market
This section builds a model in which firms hire workers on a labor market with matching frictions,
employ these workers to produce goods, and sell the production on a product market with matching
frictions. The model allows us to study how aggregate demand shocks propagate from the product
market to the labor market and how they affect unemployment. It also allows us to describe the effects
of a number of supply-side shocks: technology shocks, labor force participation shocks, and real wage
shocks. Finally, the model augmented with preferences and firm-ownership heterogeneity allows us to
examine how wages influence unemployment through their effect on labor cost and aggregate demand.
The product market has the same structure as the market for services of Section 2 with firms’
output being traded instead of workers’ services. The only difference is that the amount of items
for sale, y, is not exogenous but is determined endogenously from the production decision of firms.
The labor market also has a very similar structure. The matching frictions on the labor market are
isomorphic to those on the product market. Following Michaillat [2012], we assume that firms are
large, face a production function with diminishing marginal returns to labor, and maximize profits
taking labor market tightness and real wage as given. This section omits the description of the product
market (it is identical to the market for services of Section 2) and focuses on the labor market.
17See Ramey [2011] for a recent survey of this literature.
18With CES utility function ( > 1), the sales multipliers are not acyclical but they are always positive whereas the
consumption multipliers switch from positive to negative as tightness increases.
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3.1 Labor Market
The economy has a measure 1 of identical firms and a measure 1 of identical households. Households
own the firms and receive their profits. Household members pool their income before jointly deciding
consumption. A number h ∈ (0, 1) of household members is in the labor force, and a number 1−h is
out of the labor force. There are matching frictions on the labor market. All labor force participants
are initially unemployed and search for a job. Each firm posts vˆ vacancies to hire workers. The
number l of workers who are hired is given by a matching function taking as argument unemployment
and vacancy: l =
(
h−ηˆ + vˆ−ηˆ
)− 1
ηˆ . The parameter ηˆ > 0 influences the curvature of the matching
function. Labor market tightness is defined as the ratio of vacancy to unemployment: θ = vˆ/h.
Labor market tightness determines the probabilities that a jobseeker finds a job and a vacancy is
filled. Jobseekers find a job with probability fˆ(θ) = l/h =
(
1 + θ−ηˆ
)− 1
ηˆ , and a vacancy is filled with
probability qˆ(θ) = l/vˆ =
(
1 + θηˆ
)− 1
ηˆ . We assume away randomness at the firm and household level:
a firm hires vˆ · qˆ(θ) workers for sure, and fˆ(θ) ·h household members find a job for sure. The function
fˆ is increasing and the function qˆ is decreasing in θ. That is, when the labor market is slacker, the
probability to find a job is lower but the probability to fill a vacancy is higher.
3.2 Firms
The representative firm hires l workers. Some of the firm’s workers are engaged in production while
others are engaged in recruiting. More precisely, n < l workers are producing output y according to
the production function y = a · nα. The parameter a > 0 measures the technology of the firm and the
parameter α ∈ (0, 1) captures decreasing marginal returns to labor. Because of matching frictions on
the product market, the firm only sells a fraction f(x) of its output.
Posting a vacancy requires a fraction ρˆ > 0 of a worker’s time. Thus, the firm devotes l − n =
ρˆ · vˆ = ρˆ · l/qˆ(θ) workers to recruiting a total of l workers. The number n of production workers
is therefore related to the number l of workers by l = (1 + τˆ(θ)) · n, where τˆ(θ) ≡ ρˆ/ (qˆ(θ)− ρˆ)
measures the number of workers devoted to recruiting for each production worker. The function τˆ is
positive and strictly increasing as long as qˆ(θ) > ρˆ. The firm pays its l workers a real wage w, and
the wage bill of the firm is (1 + τˆ(θ)) · w · n. From this perspective, matching frictions in the labor
market impose a wedge τˆ(θ) on the wage of production workers.
Given θ, x, p, and w, the firm chooses n to maximize profits
Π = p · f(x) · a · nα − (1 + τˆ(θ)) · p · w · n.
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The optimal number of production workers satisfies:
f(x) · a · α · nα−1 = (1 + τˆ(θ)) · w. (12)
This relationship says that at the optimum, the real marginal revenue of one production worker equals
the real marginal cost of one production worker. The real marginal revenue is the marginal product of
labor, a · α · nα−1, times the selling probability, f(x). The real marginal cost is the real wage, w, plus
the marginal recruiting cost, τˆ(θ) · w.
3.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is the same in Section 2. To obtain a convenient representation of the equilib-
rium, we define aggregate demand, aggregate supply, labor demand, and labor supply functions. The
aggregate demand is given by (7). The aggregate supply is given by cs(x, n) = (f(x)− ρ · x) · a ·nα.
Labor supply and labor demand are defined as follows:
DEFINITION 5. The labor demand is a function of labor market tightness, product market tightness,
and real wage defined by
nd(θ, x, w) =
[
f(x) · a · α
(1 + τˆ(θ)) · w
] 1
1−α
for all (θ, x, w) ∈ [0, θm]× (0,+∞)× (0,+∞), where θm > 0 satisfies ρˆ = qˆ(θm). The labor supply
is a function of labor market tightness defined for all for all θ ∈ [0, xm] by
ns(θ) =
(
fˆ(θ)− ρˆ · θ
)
· h.
The labor demand gives the number of production workers that satisfies the firm’s optimal em-
ployment choice, given by (12). The labor supply gives the number of production workers employed
after the matching process when a number h of household members are in the labor force. Lemma 2
establishes a few properties of labor demand and labor supply:
LEMMA 2. The function nd is strictly decreasing in θ, strictly increasing in x, strictly decreasing in
w, nd(θ = 0, x, w) = [f(x) · a · α · (1− ρˆ)/w] 11−α , and nd(θm, x, w) = 0. The function ns is strictly
increasing on [0, θ∗], strictly decreasing on [θ∗, θm], ns(θ = 0) = 0, ns(θm) = 0, and ns(θ∗) = n∗. θ∗
maximizes n =
[
fˆ(θ)− ρˆ · θ
]
· h so that fˆ ′(θ∗) = ρˆ and n∗ =
[
fˆ(θ∗)− ρˆ · θ∗
]
· h. The constants θ∗
and n∗ depend on ρˆ, ηˆ, and h.
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Figure 6: Short-run labor market equilibrium
The behavior of the labor supply is the same as that of the aggregate supply because the matching
process is similar on labor and product markets. The labor demand decreases with w and θ because
when either of them increases, the effective wage of production worker, (1 + τˆ(θ)) · w, increases
and firms reduce hiring of production workers. The labor demand increases with x because when x
increases, the probability f(x) to sell output increases and firms increase hiring of production workers.
Figure 6(a) represents labor demand and labor supply in a (n, θ) plane. The labor demand curve
slopes downward. The labor supply curve slopes upward for θ ≤ θ∗ and downward for θ ≥ θ∗.
The figure also shows the labor force, h, employment, l = fˆ(θ) · h, unemployment u = h − l =
(1 − fˆ(θ)) · h, the number of production workers, n = l/(1 + τˆ(θ)), and the number of recruiters,
l−n = [τˆ(θ)/(1 + τˆ(θ))] · l. Figure 6(b) represents labor demand and labor supply in a (n,w) plane.
We now define and characterize the general equilibrium:
DEFINITION 6. Given real wage w > 0 and product market tightness x > 0, a short-run labor
market equilibrium consists of a pair (θ, n) of labor market tightness and employment such that labor
supply equals labor demand and employment is given by the labor demand: n
s(θ) = nd(θ, x, w)
n = nd(θ, x, w)
Given price p > 0 and production employment n > 0, a short-run product market equilibrium
consists of a pair (x, c) of product market tightness and consumption such that aggregate supply
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equals aggregate demand and consumption is given by the aggregate demand: c
s(x, n) = cd(x, p)
c = cd(x, p)
Given prices (p, w), a short-run general equilibrium consists of a quadruplet (x, θ, c, n) of tightnesses
and quantities such that (θ, n) is a short-run labor market equilibrium given (x,w) and (x, c) is a
short-run product market equilibrium given (n, p).
The short-run labor market and product market equilibria are partial equilibria because they take
as given the tightness and quantity in the other market. The product market equilibrium can be rep-
resented as in Figure 2 with y = a · nα. Similarly, the labor market equilibrium is represented in
Figure 6. In general equilibrium, the two partial-equilibrium systems hold simultaneously. The fol-
lowing proposition characterizes the general equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 4. For any p > 0 and w > 0, there exists a unique short-run general equilibrium
with positive consumption. The equilibrium tightnesses, (x, θ), are the unique solution to the system
h1−α · fˆ(θ)1−α · (1 + τˆ(θ))α = a · α
w
· f(x) (13)
h · fˆ(θ) · (1 + τ(x))−1 = α
w
·
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
. (14)
Equation (13) implicitly defines θ as a strictly increasing function of x while equation (14) implicitly
defines θ as a strictly decreasing function of x. These two functions intersect exactly once.
Equation (13) arises from the partial-equilibrium condition on the labor market combining (12)
with ns(θ) =
(
fˆ(θ)− ρˆ · θ
)
· h = fˆ(θ) · h/[1 + τˆ(θ)]. Equation (14) arises from a combination
of the partial-equilibrium conditions on the labor and product markets19 combining (9) with y =
f(x) · a · nα = fˆ(θ) · h · w/α obtained from (12). Figure 7 represents the general equilibrium as
the intersection of an upward-sloping and a downward-sloping curve in a (x, θ) plane. The upward-
sloping curve is the locus of points (x, θ) that solve (13), and the downward-sloping curve is the locus
of points (x, θ) that solve (14).20
19In addition to the equilibrium with positive consumption, there exist two other equilibria with zero consumption.
Appendix A extends Proposition 4 to characterize all the possible equilibria and to describe the domain and codomain of
the functions implicitly defined by (13) and (14).
20On Figure 7, the domain of the function that solves equation (14) is [0, xm]. If the price, p, is below some threshold,
the function is only defined for x above some threshold (this threshold is necessarily below xm). At the threshold, the
function asymptotes to +∞. See Appendix A for more details.
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Figure 7: Short-run general equilibrium in the model of Section 3
In our model, firms may not want to hire all the workers in the labor force even if it is costless to
hire and consumers may not want to purchase all the production even if it is costless to shop. If the
matching costs are arbitrarily small (ρ→ 0 and ρˆ→ 0), then τ(x)→ 0 and τˆ(θ)→ 0. Equations (13)
and (14) indicate that in equilibrium, f(x) < 1 and fˆ(θ) < 1 when w and p are large enough. In that
case, some production remains unsold and some workers remain unemployed.
3.4 Efficient Allocation
DEFINITION 7. The efficient allocation is the quadruplet (x, θ, c, n) that maximizes welfare,[
χ · c −1 + (1− χ) · µ −1
] 
−1
, subject to the matching frictions on the product market, c ≤ (f(x)− ρ · x)·
a · nα, and to the matching frictions on the labor market, n ≤
(
fˆ(θ)− ρˆ · θ
)
· h.
PROPOSITION 5. The efficient allocation is (x∗, θ∗, c∗, n∗), where x∗, θ∗, c∗ and n∗ are defined by
f ′(x∗) = ρ, c∗ = [f(x∗)− ρ · x∗] · y, fˆ ′(θ∗) = ρˆ, and n∗ = [fˆ(θ∗)− ρˆ · θ∗] · h. The real wage w∗ and
price p∗ that implement the efficient allocation are
w∗ = a · α · hα−1 ·
(
1− ρ η1+η
) 1
η ·
(
1− ρˆ ηˆ1+ηˆ
)α− 1−α
ηˆ
(15)
p∗ =
χ
1− χ ·
( µ
a · hα
) 1
 ·
(
1− ρ η1+η
)1− 1+η
·η ·
(
1− ρˆ ηˆ1+ηˆ
)−α·(1+ηˆ)
·ηˆ
. (16)
The economy can be in five different regimes:
DEFINITION 8. The economy is efficient if θ = θ∗ and x = x∗, labor-slack and product-slack if
θ < θ∗ and x < x∗, labor-slack and product-tight if θ < θ∗ and x > x∗, labor-tight and product-slack
if θ > θ∗ and x < x∗, labor-tight and product-tight if θ > θ∗ and x > x∗.
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Figure 8: The five regimes of the model of Section 3
The economy behaves differently in the five regimes because the aggregate supply and labor sup-
ply functions have different properties across regimes. Proposition 6 establishes the boundaries of the
regimes in a (w, p) plane:
PROPOSITION 6. There exist a function w 7→ px(w) such that for any w > 0, the product market
is slack (x < x∗) if and only if p > px(w). There exist a function w 7→ pθ(w) such that for any w > 0,
the labor market is slack (θ < θ∗) if and only if p > pθ(w). The function px is strictly decreasing for
w ∈ (0, w∗) and strictly increasing for w ∈ (w∗,+∞). The function pθ(w) is strictly decreasing for
w ∈ (0, wL) and such that pθ(w) = 0 for all w > wL, where wL > w∗ is a constant of the parameters.
Furthermore, px(w∗) = pθ(w∗) = p∗.
Figure 8 displays the five regimes in a (w, p) plane. The labor market is slack above the curve
p = pθ(w) and tight below. The product market is slack above the curve p = px(w) and tight below.
Moreover, θ = θ∗ on the curve p = pθ(w) and x = x∗ on the curve p = px(w). As the price and wage
implementing (x∗, θ∗) are unique, the curves p = pθ(w) and p = px(w) cross only once, at (w∗, p∗).
3.5 Aggregate Demand and Other Shocks
We use comparative statics to describe the response of the equilibrium to four types of shocks: ag-
gregate demand shock, technology shock, real wage shock, and labor force participation shock. In
particular, we study the correlations between product market tightness, labor market tightness, sales,
and unemployment generated by these different shocks. The correlations are summarized in Table 2.
First, we parameterize a positive aggregate demand shock by an increase in marginal propensity
to consume, χ, or in endowment, µ, or by a decrease in price, p. A transfer of wealth from consumers
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with low marginal propensity to consume to consumers with high marginal propensity to consume,
as in Section 2.5, would have the same effects. A positive aggregate demand shock leads to an up-
ward shift of the curve defined by equation (14) in Figure 7. After the shock, labor market tightness
and product market tightness increase. Unemployment decreases because u = h · (1 − fˆ(θ)). Sales
increase because equation (13) implies that s = f(x) · a · nα = (w/α) · h · fˆ(θ). The response of
consumption and employment of production workers depends on the regime. In the efficient regime,
neither consumption nor employment respond to a marginal change in tightness. Employment of pro-
duction workers decreases in a labor-tight regime but increases in a labor-slack regime. Consumption
decreases in a product-tight and labor-tight regime but increases in a product-slack and labor-slack
regime. In the two other regimes, nα and f(x)− ρ · x move in opposite direction so it is not possible
to determine the change in consumption. In the partial-equilibrium diagram of Figure 2, a positive
aggregate demand shock leads to an upward rotation of the aggregate demand curve. This rotation
raises product market tightness. In the partial-equilibrium diagram of Figure 6, the increase in product
market tightness leads to an outward shift of labor demand because the probability to sell is higher.
Labor market tightness increases as a result. Since the number of production workers changes, aggre-
gate supply adjusts in Figure 2. Product market tightness adjusts again, which feedbacks on the labor
demand. Feedbacks between labor demand and aggregate supply continue until convergence to the
new general equilibrium with higher labor market and product market tightnesses.
Second, we consider an increase in technology, a. A positive technology shock leads to an up-
ward shift of the curve defined by equation (14) in Figure 7. After the shock, labor market tightness
increases but product market tightness decreases. For the same reasons as with a positive aggre-
gate demand shock, unemployment decreases and sales increase. And as under an aggregate demand
shock, the response of consumption and employment of production workers depends on the regime.
In the partial-equilibrium diagram of Figure 2, an increase in technology leads to an expansion of
the aggregate supply curve. In the partial-equilibrium diagram of Figure 6, an increase in technology
leads to an outward shift of the labor demand curve. The resulting changes in product market tightness
and labor market tightness influence the probability to sell and employment of production workers,
which in turn feedback to the aggregate supply and labor demand curves. Feedbacks between labor
demand and aggregate supply continue until convergence to the new general equilibrium with higher
labor market tightness and lower product market tightness.
Third, we consider an increase in real wage, w. This increase leads to downward shifts of the
curves defined by equations (13) and (14) in Figure 7. After the shock, labor market tightness de-
creases and unemployment increases. On the other hand, the response of product market tightness is
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ambiguous. We distinguish between labor-slack an labor-tight regimes. In a labor-slack regime, em-
ployment of production workers decreases when labor market tightness decreases. In the diagram of
Figure 2, the aggregate supply curve contracts whereas the aggregate demand curve remains the same.
Therefore, product market tightness, x, increases whereas consumption, given by c = cd(x, p), and
sales, given by s = (1+τ(x)) ·cd(x, p), decrease (both x 7→ cd(x, p) and x 7→ (1+τ(x)) ·cd(x, p) are
strictly decreasing). In a labor-tight regime, employment of production workers increases when labor
market tightness decreases. In the diagram of Figure 2, the aggregate supply curve expands whereas
the aggregate demand curve remains the same. Therefore, product market tightness decreases whereas
consumption and sales increase.
Finally, we consider an increase in labor force participation, h. This increase leads to downward
shifts of the curves defined by equations (13) and (14) in Figure 7. After the shock labor market
tightness, θ, decreases. Unemployment, u = h · (1− fˆ(θ)), increases because the unemployment rate,
1−fˆ(θ), increases and the number of workers in the labor force, h, increases. The response of product
market tightness, x, is ambiguous on the general-equilibrium diagram of Figure 7; instead, we use the
partial-equilibrium diagrams of Figures 2 and 6. Assume that x increases. Then the employment
of production workers, n = nd(θ, x, w), increases because the function nd is strictly increasing in
x and strictly decreasing in θ. Hence, the aggregate supply curve in Figure 2 expands and x falls
in equilibrium. We reach a contradiction so x decreases. As a consequence, consumption, given by
c = cd(x, p), and sales, given by s = (1 + τ(x)) · cd(x, p), increase. Finally, since s = f(x) · a · nα, s
increases, and f(x) decreases, it must be that n increases.
If we could map the variables of the model to macrodata, we could exploit the comparative-statics
results summarized in Table 2 to separate between different types of macroeconomic shocks. An ag-
gregate demand shock is the only shock under which product market tightness and sales are positively
correlated. A labor force participation shock is the only shock under which sales and unemployment
are positively correlated in a labor-slack regime (in a labor-tight regime, both labor force participa-
tion shock and real wage shock generate such a positive correlation). A technology shock is the only
shock under which product market tightness and labor market tightness are negatively correlated in a
labor-tight regime (in a labor-slack regime, both technology shock and real wage shock generate such
a negative correlation).
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Table 2: Comparative statics in the model of Section 3
Effect on:
Increase in: Product market tightness Labor market tightness Sales Unemployment
Aggregate demand > 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
Technology < 0 > 0 > 0 < 0
Real wage > 0 if labor-slack < 0 < 0 if labor-slack > 0
< 0 if labor-tight > 0 if labor-tight
Labor force < 0 < 0 > 0 > 0
Notes: The comparative statics are derived in Section 3.5. An increase in aggregate demand results from an increase in
endowment, µ, a decrease in price, p, or an increase in marginal propensity to consume, χ.
3.6 The Possibility of Reducing Unemployment by Increasing Wages
This section extends the model along two directions to improves its realism. First, we distinguish
between buyers in a long-term relationship with a firm, which we call customers, and other buyers.
This is equivalent to the usual assumption in labor market search models that some individuals are
already employed. Second, we account for inequality in labor income, wealth, and share of profits
received. With such extensions, a wage increase may reduce unemployment. With inequality and
customer-firm relationships, it is difficult to describe the set of price-wage pairs for which the general
equilibrium exists and to do comparative statics. To simplify, we assume Cobb-Douglas utility and
no matching costs. We describe the results formally in Appendix D and informally here.
We begin by deriving the aggregate supply. Each firm has κ < y customers, where y = a · nα
is the firm’s output. Each customer buys one good with certainty at price p > 0. The remaining
y − κ goods may be purchased by consumers who are not customers through the matching process.
Each consumer purchases κ goods through customer relationships and visits v firms to purchase more
goods through the matching process. The number of trades made in the matching process is s− κ =[
(y − κ)−η + v−η]− 1η . In each of these trades, a consumer buys one good at price p. The product
market tightness is x ≡ v/ [y − κ]. Let f(x) ≡ (s − κ)/(y − κ) be the probability that a firm sells
one good to a buyer who is not a customer. The probability f(x) satisfies (1). The matching cost, ρ,
is zero so consumption equals purchases. Accordingly, the aggregate supply is given by
cs(x, n) = κ+ f(x) · (a · nα − κ) . (17)
Next, we derive the aggregate demand. Workers belong to one of G groups of measure 1/G.
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Group g’s per person utility is given by (10). Group g’s per person budget is
mg + p · cg = µg + σg · Π +$g · p · w · n,
where σg is group g’s per person share of profits, Π are nominal profits, and $g is group g’s per
person share of labor income. By construction,
(∑
g σg
)
/G = 1 and
(∑
g$g
)
/G = 1. The
optimal consumption of produced good, cg, is related to the optimal consumption of nonproduced
good, mg, by a relationship similar to (5) with  = 1. Substituting out profits from group g’s income
using Π = p · [κ+ f(x) · (y − κ)− w · n], we find that group g’s optimal consumption satisfies
p · cg = χg · {µg + σg · p · [κ+ f(x) · (y − κ)] + ($g − σg) · p · w · n}
We define aggregate demand as the sum of each group’s demand: cd ≡
(∑
g cg
)
/G. In equilibrium,
purchases equal sales:
(∑
g cg
)
/G = κ+ f(x) · (y − κ). Thus, aggregate demand is given by
cd(n, p, w) =
1
p
·
∑
g µg · χg∑
g(1− χg) · σg
+
∑
g χg · ($g − σg)∑
g(1− χg) · σg
· w · n. (18)
Aggregate demand does not depend on product market tightness because the matching wedge, τ(x),
is zero. If profits and labor income are uniformly distributed across group such that σg = $g = 1
for all g, aggregate demand depends only on the price, p, groups’ endowments, {µg}, and groups’
preferences, {χg}. If profits or labor income are not uniformly distributed across group such that∑
g χg · ($g − σg) 6= 0, aggregate demand also depends on the wage bill, w · n. A wage increase
stimulates aggregate demand if
∑
g
χg ·$g >
∑
g
χg · σg. (19)
This condition says that across groups, the correlation between share of labor income and marginal
propensity to consume is higher than the correlation between share of profits and marginal propensity
to consume. Loosely speaking, wage earners have a higher marginal propensity to consume than firm
owners; alternatively, profits are more concentrated among savers than labor income. A wage in-
crease always redistributes income from firm owners to wage earners. If (19) holds, this redistribution
stimulates aggregate demand.
The labor market is the same as above and the marginal decisions of firms are not affected by the
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presence of customers; hence, labor demand and labor supply satisfy Definition 5. Aggregate supply
and aggregate demand satisfy (17) and (18). A short-run general equilibrium satisfies Definition 6. A
major difference with the results from Proposition 4 is that a general equilibrium does not exist for all
parameter values and all price-wage pairs. But when a general equilibrium with positive consumption
and employment exists, it is unique and we can perform comparative statics.
We identify conditions on parameter values such that a wage increase reduces unemployment.
Condition (19) is necessary because it ensures that a wage increase stimulates aggregate demand.
Another necessary condition is
[∑
g µg · χg
]
/
[∑
g(1− χg) · σg
]
< κ, which requires the customer
base κ to be positive. Under this condition the labor-income component of aggregate demand tends
to be large relative to the endowment component, and a wage increase tends to have a large positive
effect on aggregate demand.
In fact, a wage increase has two opposite effects. First, a wage increase raises the marginal cost
of labor and depresses labor demand. This is the conventional effect, which is found in all matching
models of the labor market. Second, a wage increase redistributes income from firm owners to wage
earners. This redistribution stimulates aggregate demand if wage earners have a higher marginal
propensity to consumer than firm owners. An increase in aggregate demand leads to higher product
market tightness, which stimulates labor demand. This is an unconventional effect, which arises in
our model only in presence of a frictional product market and inequality. A wage increase lowers
unemployment when the unconventional positive response of aggregate demand to the wage increase
is strong enough to dominate the conventional negative response of labor demand.
The result that a wage increase may decrease unemployment has a number of implications. One
implication is that the effect of the minimum wage on employment may be different in partial equi-
librium and in general equilibrium. In partial equilibrium the influence of the minimum wage on
aggregate demand is omitted. In general equilibrium the influence of the minimum wage on aggre-
gate demand is accounted for. Increasing the minimum wage necessarily depresses employment in
partial equilibrium, but when (19) holds, the disemployment effect of the minimum wage is not as
strong in general equilibrium as in partial equilibrium. Under stronger conditions, the minimum wage
may have a negative employment effect in partial equilibrium but a positive employment effect in
general equilibrium.21 One possible reason why empirical studies estimating the employment effect
of the minimum wage reach conflicting conclusions is that these studies do not distinguish between
21This discussion parallels the comparison of the microelasticity and macroelasticity of unemployment with respect to
unemployment insurance in Landais, Michaillat and Saez [2010].
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partial- and general-equilibrium effects.22 On the one hand, studies measuring employment effects
within a labor market, for example by comparing workers eligible for the minimum wage to workers
ineligible, estimate partial-equilibrium effects. On the other hand, studies measuring employment
effects across labor markets estimate general-equilibrium effects. If (19) held, the within-state studies
would systematically estimate larger disemployment effect than the cross-state studies.
4 Relation to Other Macroeconomic Models
In this section, we argue that our matching framework is not restrictive. With alternative assumptions
about the functional forms of the utility, production, and matching functions, the value of matching
costs, and the price and wage schedules, our framework can replicate the key first-order conditions
of a broad range of macroeconomic models—perfect-competition model, existing matching models,
fixprice-fixwage model, and monopolistic-competition model. We then explain why making these
alternative assumptions would eliminate aggregate demand effects captured by our model.
4.1 Perfect-Competition Model
Assume that the matching costs, ρ and ρˆ, are zero. Assume that the real wage equals the marginal
product of the last worker in the labor force and that the price equals the marginal rate of substitution
between the produced good and the nonproduced good at full employment:
w = a · α · hα−1 (20)
p =
χ
1− χ ·
( µ
a · hα
) 1

. (21)
Under these assumptions, equation (14) implies that
fˆ(θ) =
1
h
· α
a · α · hα−1 ·
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ ·
(
χ
1− χ
)−
·
(
a · hα
µ
)
= 1.
Thus, θ → +∞ and n = fˆ(θ) · h = h. Equation (13) implies that
f(x) =
a · α · hα−1
a · α · h
1−α = 1.
22For a survey of the vast empirical literature on the minimum wage, see for instance Card and Krueger [1995].
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Thus, x → +∞ and c = f(x) · a · hα = a · hα. Labor and product markets behave as if they were
perfectly competitive. The matching wedges are zero: τ(x) = τˆ(θ) = 0. Firms sell all of their
production at the going price: f(x) = 1. All labor force participants find a job at the going wage:
fˆ(θ) = 1. There is no unemployment: n = h. There is no unsold production: c = a · hα.
These assumptions are inadequate to study aggregate demand because they eliminate all the effects
from aggregate demand shocks. Indeed, employment and consumption do not depend on aggregate
demand: n = h and c = a · hα for any value µ of endowment and any value χ of the marginal
propensity to consume. Aggregate demand shocks have no effect because any shock to the marginal
propensity to consume, χ, or the endowment, µ, is absorbed by a corresponding change in price, p,
such that the aggregate demand, cd = [χ/(1− χ)] · (µ/p), does not change.
4.2 Other Matching Models
The following assumptions capture the main features of existing matching models with a product
market and a labor market. We assume that consumers have a linear utility function, which is the
special case of the CES utility function when  → +∞, and that firms have a linear production
function, which is the special case of our production function when α = 1. The optimal consumption
choice of consumers, given by (5), and the optimal employment choice of firms, given by (12), yield
(1 + τ(x)) · p = χ
1− χ (22)
(1 + τˆ(θ)) · w = a · f(x). (23)
Equations (22) and (23) show that tightnesses are pinned down independently of quantities so that
both aggregate demand and labor demand are perfectly elastic with respect to x and θ respectively.
The diagrams of Figure 9 represent the product market in a (c, x) plane and the labor market in a
(n, θ) plane. Both aggregate demand and labor demand are represented by horizontal curves.
Existing matching models assume either that price and wage are the outcome of bargaining, or
that price and wage are rigid.23 In a bargaining model, real wage and price are given by
w = βˆ · a · f(x) (24)
p = β · χ
1− χ, (25)
23See Wasmer [2011] for a model assuming bargaining and Hall [2008] for a model assuming rigid price and wage.
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Figure 9: The matching model with linear utility function and linear production function
where β ∈ (0, 1) and βˆ ∈ (0, 1) are parameters. The real wage is the generalized Nash solution of
the bargaining problem between a worker and a firm when the worker has bargaining power βˆ. The
surplus to the firm of hiring one worker is F(w) = a · f(x)− w. The surplus to the worker of being
hired is W(w) = w. The Nash solution maximizes F(w)1−βˆ · W(w)βˆ , so W(w) = βˆ · [W(w) +
F(w)] = βˆ · a · f(x) and w satisfies (24). The price is the generalized Nash solution to the bargaining
problem between a consumer and a firm when the firm has bargaining power β. The surplus to the
consumer of buying one unit of produced good is C(p) = χ− p · (1− χ). The surplus to the firm of
selling one unit of produced good is F(p) = p · (1 − χ). Firms are owned by consumers so firms’
marginal income is valued at consumers’ marginal utility of consumption of nonproduced good. The
Nash solution maximizes C(p)1−β · F(p)β , so F(p) = β · [F(p) + C(p)] = β · χ and p satisfies (25).
Combining (22), (23), (24) and (25), we determine the equilibrium tightnesses:
β · (1 + τ(x)) = 1 and βˆ · (1 + τˆ(θ)) = 1.
Hence both x and θ are pinned down independently of quantities hereby eliminating all the effects
from aggregate demand shocks. Indeed, employment and consumption are given by the supply equa-
tions n = ns(θ) and c = cs(x, n) and are independent of the aggregate demand parameters, µ and χ.
Aggregate demand shocks are eliminated because the bargained price is proportional to the marginal
rate of substitution between produced good and nonproduced good, χ/(1− χ).
Instead of assuming price and wage bargaining, assume instead that price and real wage are pa-
rameters of the model as in Hall [2008]. For the equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that p < χ/(1−χ)
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and w < a. The equilibrium tightnesses are given by (22) and (23). Since price and wage are rigid,
aggregate demand shocks (shocks to χ) affect equilibrium tightnesses and quantities. However, many
elements of our analysis disappear in this model because the demand curves are perfectly elastic: the
transfers of Section 2.5 have no effect because wealth plays no role; the government-purchase multi-
plier of Section 2.6 is always zero; unemployment and unsold production would disappear in absence
of matching costs, irrespective of the level of aggregate demand or labor demand.
4.3 Monopolistic-Competition Model
We begin by presenting a model with monopolistic competition on the product market and labor
market. The model is a variant of the model of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987, Section 2]. Since
this model is standard, we omit derivations and only report equilibrium conditions. The economy is
composed of a continuum of firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] and a continuum of households indexed by
j ∈ [0, 1]. The goods produced by firms are imperfect substitutes and the types of labor supplied by
households are also imperfect substitutes, so firms and households have some monopoly power.
The utility function of household j is given by
χ · ln(cj) + (1− χ) · ln(mj)− ν · ξ
1 + ξ
· n
1+ξ
ξ
j . (26)
Utility depends on consumption of nonproduced good, mj , number of hours worked, nj ∈ (0, 1), and
a consumption index, cj ≡
(∫ 1
0
c
ζ−1
ζ
ij di
) ζ
ζ−1
, where cij is consumption of good i. The parameters
ν > 0, ξ > 0, and ζ > 1, measure the disutility from labor, the curvature of the disutility for labor,
and the elasticity of substitution between goods in utility. The budget constraint of household j is
mj +
∫ 1
0
pi · cijdi = µj +Wj · nj + Πj, (27)
where pi is the price of good i, Wj is the nominal wage for labor of type j, Πj is the share of aggregate
profits distributed to the household, and µj > 0 is the endowment received by the household. The
aggregate endowment of nonproduced good is µ =
∫ 1
0
µjdj. Given {pi}, household j chooses {cij},
mj , nj , and Wj to maximize (26) subject to (27) and to a demand schedule for its labor, a decreasing
function of Wj arising from firms’ profit maximization.
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Firm i hires labor to produce output. Its production function is
ci = a ·
(∫ 1
0
n
γ−1
γ
ij dj
)α· γ
γ−1
, (28)
where ci is output of good i, a is the technology level, nij is the number of workers of type j hired,
γ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between types of labor in production, and α < 1 indicates
decreasing returns to scale. Given {Wj}, firm i chooses {nij}, ci and pi to maximize profits
pi · ci −
∫ 1
0
Wj · nijdj.
subject to (28) and to a demand schedule for its good, a decreasing function of pi arising from house-
holds’ utility maximization.
In the symmetric general equilibrium, all households and firms are identical, they set the same
prices and wages, and they produce and work the same amounts. In this equilibrium, we have
W
p
=
γ
γ − 1 · ν · n
1
ξ · c
χ
(29)
p
W
=
ζ
ζ − 1 ·
1
α · a · n
1−α, (30)
whereW is the nominal wage paid by all firms, p is the price charged by all firms, and n and cmeasure
the aggregate number of hours worked and aggregate quantity of goods produced. Equation (29) says
that households set the real wage at a markup γ/(γ − 1) > 1 over its marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption. Equation (30) says that firms set the price at a markup ζ/(ζ−1) > 1
over the marginal cost of producing one item.
Our matching model generates the same markups as the model with monopolistic competition
under appropriate assumptions. Assume that matching costs are zero and that consumers have a
utility function given by χ · ln(c) + (1 − χ) · ln(m) − ν · [ξ/ (1 + ξ)] · h 1+ξξ , where h is the number
of workers in the labor force searching for a job. Given that h = n/fˆ(θ), the optimal choice of labor
force participation imposes
W
p
=
1
fˆ(θ)
1+ξ
ξ
· ν · n 1ξ · c
χ
,
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where W ≡ w · p is the nominal wage. With ρˆ = 0 and hence τˆ(θ) = 0, equation (12) becomes
p
W
=
1
f(x)
· 1
α · a · n
1−α.
We make two assumptions on tightnesses to close the model:
f(x) =
ζ − 1
ζ
(31)
fˆ(θ) =
(
γ − 1
γ
) ξ
1+ξ
. (32)
These assumptions impose that the job-finding probability is the inverse of the labor market markup
and the selling probability is the inverse of the product market markup to the power of ξ/(1+ξ). Under
these conditions, the quadruplet (c, n,W, p) satisfies equations (29) and (30) both in the model with
matching frictions and in the model with monopolistic competition. The ratio between the marginal
product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution, sometimes called the labor wedge, is therefore
identical in the two models and equal to γ · ξ/ [(γ − 1) · (ξ − 1)] > 1.
These assumptions are inadequate to study aggregate demand because they eliminate all the effects
from aggregate demand shocks. Indeed, unemployment rate and consumption do not depend on
aggregate demand: u =
(
1− fˆ(θ)
)
· h and c = f(x) · a · fˆ(θ)α · hα where f(x) and fˆ(θ) depend
only on the parameters ζ , γ, and ξ and not on the parameters capturing aggregate demand, µ and
χ. Aggregate demand shocks have no effect because the price always adjusts such that (31) holds.
Given that f(x) and the real wage remain the same, the labor demand does not respond to aggregate
demand shocks. The labor supply does not respond either so unemployment is unaffected. In fact,
the price response is such that the aggregate demand curve does not shift in response to aggregate
demand shocks. Aggregate demand shocks impact unemployment in this model only if (31) and (32)
do not always hold. One way to eliminate (31) and (32) is to assume instead that price and real wage
are somewhat rigid, which brings us back to the model of Section 3.24
4.4 Fixprice-Fixwage Model
The standard fixprice-fixwage model was developed by Barro and Grossman [1971].25 Our model
cannot replicate the allocation of that model because firms’ sales are sometimes determined by a
24This is only a reinterpretation of the insight of Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987]. They showed that aggregate demand
shocks have effects in the monopolistic-competition model only if prices are rigid.
25See Be´nassy [1993] for an overview of this class of models and their properties.
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demand constraint in that model whereas they are always determined by a marginal decision in our
model.26 Our model can, however, replicate the allocation of a fixprice-fixwage model with a propor-
tional rationing rule. With this rule, all agents on the rationed side of the market trade with the same
probability. This alternative model predicts slightly different allocations from the standard fixprice-
fixwage model, but the allocations can still be sorted into its four traditional regimes.
To replicate the allocation of the fixprice-fixwage model with proportional rationing, we assume
that the matching costs are zero and that the matching functions are given by s = min {v, y} and
l = min {vˆ, h}. These matching functions are the special case of those considered in our model when
η → +∞ and ηˆ → +∞. Since the matching functions have a kink, the matching probabilities have
a kink as well: f(x) = min {x, 1} and fˆ(θ) = min {θ, 1}. Accordingly, the supply functions are
defined piecewise, with one piece when the relevant tightness is below 1 and one piece when it is
above 1: ns(θ) = min {θ, 1} · h and cs(x, n) = min {x, 1} · a · nα. Since the matching wedges, τ(x)
and τˆ(θ), are zero, the demand functions do not depend on the tightness in their market: nd(θ, x, w) =
(min {x, 1} · a · α/w) 11−α and cd(p) = [χ/ (1− χ)] · µ/p. In particular, equilibrium consumption
is c = [χ/ (1− χ)] · µ/p. Supply and demand curves are represented in Figure 10 in a (c, x) plane
and in a (n, θ) plane. The aggregate supply and labor supply are piecewise linear with a kink at
x = 1 and θ = 1, respectively; the aggregate demand is vertical; and the labor demand is vertical.
Given price and real wage, tightnesses and quantities are determined by the intersection of supply
and demand curves. By introducing matching functions that govern the number of trades on each
market, we rewrite the fixprice-fixwage model, which traditionally is a disequilibrium model, as an
equilibrium model. Before describing the four regimes, we define two functions to help delimitate
them: p 7→ wθ(p) = (α/h) · [χ/ (1− χ)] ·µ/p and p 7→ wx(p) = α · a 1α · {[(1− χ) /χ] · p/µ} 1−αα .
The function wθ decreases from +∞ to 0 for p ∈ (0,+∞). The function wx increases from 0 to +∞
for p ∈ (0,+∞). Accordingly, the equation wθ(p) = wx(p) admits a unique solution on (0,+∞),
which we denote p∗. We denote w∗ = wθ(p∗). We can show that p∗ is given by (21) and w∗ is given
by (20). Figure 10(c) delimitates the four regimes in a (p, w) plane.
In the Keynesian unemployment regime, there is excess supply in the labor and product market:
26Indeed when demand is low in the standard fixprice-fixwage model, firms sell all of their output up to a fixed number
of items and none above that number. In our model, firms sell all their output with the same probability; they choose
output and thus sales to equalize marginal cost with marginal revenue.
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1 > fˆ(θ) = θ and 1 > f(x) = x. The equilibrium tightnesses satisfy
θ =
α
h · w ·
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
x =
wα
a · αα ·
[(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
]1−α
.
Employment n = θ · h is determined partly by aggregate demand and partly by the real wage. In
the standard fixprice-fixwage model, employment only depends on demand in the Keynesian unem-
ployment regime. In our model, employment also depends on the wage because firms have a positive
probability to sell any amount of production so employment is determined by the marginal cost of
labor and not by a quantity constraint. This regime prevails if w > wθ(p) and w < wx(p). In the
classical unemployment regime, there is excess supply in the labor market and excess demand in the
product market: 1 > fˆ(θ) = θ and 1 = f(x). Product market tightness x ≥ 1 is irrelevant. Labor
market tightness satisfies
θ =
1
h
·
(α · a
w
) 1
1−α
.
Employment n = θ · h is completely determined by the real wage. Aggregate demand does not
matter because firms sell all their production for sure on the product market. This regime prevails if
w > w∗ and w = wx(p). If w > wx(p), there is no equilibrium. In the underconsumption regime,
there is excess demand in the labor market and excess supply in the product market: fˆ(θ) = 1 and
1 > f(x) = x. Labor market tightness θ ≥ 1 is irrelevant. Product market tightness satisfies
x =
w
a · α · hα−1 .
There is no unemployment: n = h. This regime prevails if w < w∗ and w = wθ(p). If w < wθ(p),
there is no equilibrium. In the repressed inflation regime, there is excess demand in the labor market
and excess demand in the product market: fˆ(θ) = 1 and f(x) = 1. The tightnesses x ≥ 1 and θ ≥ 1
are irrelevant. There is no unemployment: n = h. This regime prevails for w = w∗ and p = p∗. Price
and real wage are exactly the same as in the perfectly competitive case. Thus, the repressed inflation
regime is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium.
The assumptions made in this section could be used to study the effect of aggregate demand on
unemployment. However, these assumptions limit the theory without clear advantages. First, the
equilibrium is not well defined for all positive prices and wages. Second, the theory is complex
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Figure 10: The fixprice-fixwage model of Section 4.4
because it requires to determine in which of the four regimes the economy operates in order to know
which equilibrium conditions hold. Third, aggregate demand plays an interesting role only in the
Keynesian unemployment regime, and not in the other regimes.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a parsimonious model that links unemployment to aggregate demand. We en-
vision three applications for the model. First, the model could be used to analyse the impact on
unemployment of a broad range of fiscal policies that affect simultaneously aggregate demand, labor
demand, and labor supply. The model could address the following questions: Should unemployment
insurance be more generous in recessions to stimulate aggregate demand, or should it be less generous
to incentivize jobseekers to search more? Should payroll tax shift from employees to employers in
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recessions to stimulate aggregate demand, or should it shift from employers to employees to reduce
labor cost and stimulate hiring? Should the minimum wage rise in recessions to increase the income
of poorer workers with a high marginal propensity to consume and thus stimulate aggregate demand,
or should it fall to stimulate hiring of low-income workers? Should income tax be more progressive
in recessions to stimulate aggregate demand, or should it be more regressive to encourage work?
Second, empirical research could exploit the theoretical predictions of the model to identify the
macroeconomic shocks driving business cycle fluctuations. A key result of our analysis is that product
market tightness and sales are positively correlated under aggregate demand shocks, whereas they are
negatively correlated under other shocks. This result implies that the probability to sell goods is
procyclical under aggregate demand shocks and countercyclical under other shocks. This probability
can be measured by the ratio of sales to stock for sales in a given period. Hence, empirical research
on the cyclical behavior of sales and inventories could be useful to separate between different types
of macroeconomic shocks. For instance, Bils and Kahn [2000] study empirically the cyclicality of
the ratio of sales to stock for sales in the manufacturing sector in the US. They find that this ratio is
strongly procyclical, suggesting that aggregate demand shocks play an important role in their data.
Third, the model could be a starting point to build a more sophisticated dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model featuring unsold production and unemployment. An important restriction of the
theory, however, needs to be addressed to obtain a quantitatively realistic macroeconomic model.
The restriction is that prices are completely rigid in the short-run in response to a shock and that all
adjustments take place through tightnesses. Naturally in the long-run, market forces could push prices
to adjust if their level is inefficient. For instance if prices are too high, new markets may be created
with lower prices but higher tightness.27 Sellers and buyers have incentives to move to these new
markets because they are more efficient so there is a larger surplus to share. Sellers are compensated
for the lower price with a higher probability to sell. Buyers are compensated for the higher matching
wedge by a lower price. A mechanism that could lead to the creation of these new markets and
dynamic price adjustments in the medium-run is the competitive search mechanism of Moen [1997].
Modeling these market forces would provide a microfoundation for the aggregate supply curve of
the traditional AS-AD model; indeed, the AS curve represents the price increase arising when the
economy is overheating and the price decrease arising when the economy is slack.
27Lazear [2010] finds evidence of such behavior for price and tightness in the housing market in the US.
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Appendix
A Proofs
We start by proving a lemma that we use repeatedly in the proofs. The lemma characterizes the
matching probabilities, defined by q(x) = (1 + xη)−
1
η and f(x) = (1 + x−η)−
1
η , the matching wedge,
defined by τ(x) = ρ/(q(x)−ρ), and the tightnesses xm and x∗, defined by f ′(x∗) = ρ and q(xm) = ρ.
LEMMA A1. The functions f , q, and τ and the values xm and x∗ satisfy the following properties:
• xm = (ρ−η − 1) 1η
• f(xm) = (1− ρη) 1η .
• τ(xm) = +∞ and 1/(1 + τ(xm)) = 0.
• x∗ =
(
ρ−
η
1+η − 1
) 1
η
• q(x∗) = ρ
1
1+η .
• f(x∗) =
(
1− ρ η1+η
) 1
η
.
• τ(x∗) = 1/
(
ρ−
η
1+η − 1
)
and 1/(1 + τ(x∗)) = 1− ρ η1+η .
• f(0) = 0 and limx→+∞ f(x) = 1.
• f is positive, smooth, and strictly increasing on [0,+∞).
• q(0) = 1 and limx→+∞ q(x) = 0.
• q is positive, smooth, and strictly decreasing on [0,+∞).
• τ(0) = ρ/(1− ρ) and limx→xm τ(x) = +∞.
• τ is positive, smooth, and strictly increasing on [0, xm).
• f(x) = q(x) · x.
• q′(x) = −q(x)1+η · xη−1.
• f ′(x) = q(x)1+η.
Proof. The results follow from simple algebra.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The proof follows directly from the definitions of x∗ and c∗, and from Lemma A1.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
In this section we propose an extension of Proposition 1 and prove it.
PROPOSITION A1. For any p > 0, there are two short-run equilibria: (xm, 0) and (x, c) where x
is implicitly defined by
(1 + τ(x))−1 · f(x) · y =
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
(A1)
and c = cs(x). In particular, x ∈ (0, xm) and c > 0.
Proof. We are looking for a tightness x ∈ [0, xm] that satisfies cs(x) = cd(x, p) or
1
1 + τ(x)
·
[
f(x) · y −
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
· 1
(1 + τ(x))−1
]
= 0.
1/ (1 + τ(xm)) = 0 by definition of xm; hence, (xm, cs(xm)) = (xm, 0) is always an equilibrium.
Furthermore, 1/ (1 + τ(x)) > 0 for x < xm so any equilibrium tightness x < xm must satisfy (A1).
Since  > 1, Lemma A1 implies that x 7→ (1 + τ(x))−1 ·f(x) is strictly increasing and (1 + τ(0))−1 ·
f(0) = 0 and limx→xm (1 + τ(x))
−1 · f(x) = +∞. Thus, there is a unique x ∈ (0, xm) that
satisfies (A1).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
An efficient allocation (x, c) is such that c = cs(x) and x maximizes cs(x). Lemma 1 implies that
x = x∗ and c = c∗. There is a unique price p∗ that implements the efficient allocation. This price
satisfies
(p∗) =
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
y
· 1
f(x∗) · (1 + τ(x∗))−1 .
The reason is that with p = p∗, x∗ satisfies (A1). Lemma A1 implies that f(x∗) =
(
1− ρ η1+η
) 1
η
and
(1 + τ(x∗))−1 =
(
1− ρ η1+η
)1−
. Thus,
p∗ =
χ
1− χ ·
(
µ
y
) 1

·
(
1− ρ η1+η
)1− η+1
η·
.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Obvious using the results of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 2
This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
In this section we propose an extension of Proposition 4 and prove it.
PROPOSITION A2. For any p > 0 and w > 0, there are three short-run general equilibria:
(x, θ, n, c) where x < xm and θ < θm solve the system
h1−α · fˆ(θ)1−α · (1 + τˆ(θ))α = f(x) · a · α
w
(A2)
h · fˆ(θ) · (1 + τ(x))−1 = α
w
·
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
. (A3)
and n = ns(θ) > 0 and c = cs(x, n) > 0; (xm, θm, 0, 0); and (xm, θ, 0, n) where θ < θm solves (A2)
for x = xm and n = ns(θ) > 0.
Proof. In general equilibrium, (x, θ) satisfies the following system of two equations:
ns(θ) = nd(θ, x, w) (A4)
cs(x, ns(θ)) = cd(x, p). (A5)
First case: θ < θm and x < xm. 1/(1 + τ(x)) ∈ (0,+∞) and 1/(1 + τˆ(θ)) ∈ (0,+∞) so we can
rewrite the system (A4)–(A5) as (A2)–(A3). Equation (A4) is equivalent to(
1
1 + τˆ(θ)
)1−α
·
[
fˆ(θ)1−α · h1−α − a · α
w
· f(x) · 1
(1 + τˆ(θ))α
]
= 0. (A6)
Since the first factor is positive, this equation implies that the second factor must be zero. Multiplying
the second factor by (1 + τˆ(θ))α yields (A2). Following the proof of Proposition A1, we modify (A5)
to obtain
f(x) · a ·
(
fˆ(θ)
1 + τˆ(θ)
· h
)α
· (1 + τ(x))−1 =
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
; (A7)
Multiplying both sides of the equation by α/w and substituting (A2) into this equation yields (A3).
We now show that for any p > 0 and w > 0, the system (A2)–(A3) admits a unique solution.
Since α < 1, Lemma A1 implies that θ 7→ fˆ(θ)1−α · (1 + τˆ(θ))α is strictly increasing from 0 to +∞
for θ ∈ [0, θm). Hence, equation (A2) implicitly defines θ as a function of x ∈ [0,+∞): θ = ΘL(x).
Lemma A1 shows that f is strictly increasing from 0 to 1 on (0,+∞); thus, ΘL is strictly increasing
on (0,+∞), ΘL(0) = 0, and limx→+∞ΘL(x) = θL > 0 where θL ∈ (0, θm) is implicitly defined by
h1−α · fˆ(θL)1−α · (1 + τˆ(θL))α = a · α/w.
If [α/(w · h)] · [χ/ (1− χ)] · (µ/p) ≥ 1, define xP (p, w) by
(
1 + τ(xP )
)−1
=
α
w · h ·
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ
p
.
If [α/(w · h)] · [χ/ (1− χ)] · (µ/p) < 1, xP (p, w) ≡ 0. Since  > 1, Lemma A1 implies that
x 7→ (1 + τ(x))−1 is strictly increasing from 1 to +∞ for x ∈ [0, xm); therefore, xP is well defined
and xP (p, w) ∈ (0, xm). Lemma A1 shows that fˆ is strictly increasing from 0 to 1 on (0,+∞),
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which implies that equation (A3) implicitly defines θ as a function of x ∈ (xP (p, w), xm): θ =
ΘP (x). Moreover, ΘP is strictly decreasing on (xP (p, w), xm), limx→xP (p,w) ΘP (x) = +∞, and
limx→xm ΘP (x) = 0.
The system (A2)–(A3) is equivalent to{
ΘL(x) = ΘP (x)
θ = ΘP (x)
Given the properties of the functions ΘL and ΘP , we conclude that this system admits a unique
solution (x, θ) with x ∈ (xP (p, w), xm) and θ ∈ (0, θL).
Second case: x = xm. cs(xm, ns(θ)) = 0 = cd(xm, p) so (A5) is necessarily satisfied. When (A4)
is rewritten as (A6), it is clear that it admits exactly two solutions for x = xm: θm and ΘL(xm) < θm.
To summarize, there are exactly two general equilibria when x = xm: (xm, θm, 0, 0) and (xm, θ, 0, n)
where θ < θm solves (A2) for x = xm and n = ns(θ) > 0.
Third case: θ = θm. ns(θm) = 0 = nd(θm, x, w) so (A4) is necessarily satisfied. Then, ns(θm) = 0
so (A5) becomes cs(x, 0) = cd(x, p). Since cs(x, 0) = 0, x solves cd(x, p) = 0, which imposes
x = xm. Thus, we are back to the second case.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
An efficient allocation (x, θ, c, n) is such that n = ns(θ) and θ maximizes ns(θ). Lemma 2 implies
that θ = θ∗ and n = n∗. An efficient allocation is also such that c = cs(x, n∗) and x maximizes
cs(x, n∗). Lemma 1 implies that x = x∗ and c = c∗ = (f(x∗)− ρ · x∗) · a · (n∗)α.
There exists a unique pair (p∗, w∗) that implements the efficient allocation. The pair satisfies
w∗ = a · α · f(x∗) · hα−1 · fˆ(θ∗)α−1 · (1 + τˆ(θ∗))−α
(p∗) =
α
w∗
·
(
χ
1− χ
)
· µ · 1
h · fˆ(θ∗) · (1 + τ(x
∗))1− .
The reason is that with p = p∗ and w = w∗, (x∗, θ∗) satisfies the system (A2)–(A3). Lemma A1
implies that f(x∗) =
(
1− ρ η1+η
) 1
η
, fˆ(θ∗) =
(
1− ρˆ ηˆ1+ηˆ
) 1
ηˆ
, (1 + τ(x∗)) =
(
1− ρ η1+η
)−1
, and
(1 + τˆ(θ∗)) =
(
1− ρˆ ηˆ1+ηˆ
)−1
. After some algebra, we conclude that
w∗ = a · α · hα−1 ·
(
1− ρ η1+η
) 1
η ·
(
1− ρˆ ηˆ1+ηˆ
)α− 1−α
ηˆ
p∗ =
χ
1− χ ·
( µ
a · hα
) 1
 ·
(
1− ρ η1+η
)1− 1+η
·η ·
(
1− ρˆ ηˆ1+ηˆ
)−α·(1+ηˆ)
·ηˆ
.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
We build on the proof of Proposition 4 and use the same notations. The function ΘL : [0,+∞) ×
(0,+∞) → (0,+∞) is defined such that θ = ΘL(x,w) solves (A2). The function ΘL is strictly in-
48
creasing in x and strictly decreasing inw. The function ΘP :
{
(x, p, w)|p > 0, w > 0, xP (p, w) < x < xm}→
(0,+∞) is defined such that θ = ΘP (x, p, w) solves (A3). The function ΘP is strictly decreasing in
x, strictly decreasing in p, and strictly decreasing in w. The first part of the proof is illustrated in
Figure 1(a). The second part of the proof is illustrated in Figure 1(b).
First part: condition such that θ < θ∗. Let wL be defined by ΘL(xm, wL) = θ∗. For all w > wL
and for all x ∈ [0, xm], ΘL(x,w) < θ∗. For all w ≤ wL, there exists a unique x ∈ [0, xm] such that
ΘL(x,w) = θ∗. We implicitly define the function xL : (0, wL] → [0, xm] by ΘL(xL(w), w) = θ∗.
In particular, limw→0 xL(w) = 0, xL(w∗) = x∗ and xL(wL) = xm and xL is strictly increasing. We
define the function pθ : (0, wL)→ (0,+∞) by
pθ(w) =
χ
1− χ ·
[(
1 + τ(xL(w))
)1−
h · fˆ(θ∗) ·
α · µ
w
] 1

.
The function pθ is strictly decreasing from +∞ to 0 for w ∈ (0, wL) and pθ(w∗) = p∗. By definition,
ΘP (xL(w), pθ(w), w) = θ∗.
Let θ denote equilibrium labor market tightness and x denote equilibrium product market tight-
ness. For any w > wL, θ < θ∗ because ΘL(x,w) < θ∗ for all x ∈ [0, xm] and because θ =
ΘL(x,w). Consider w ≤ wL. For any p > pθ(w), ΘP (xL(w), p, w) < ΘP (xL(w), pθ(w), w) = θ∗ =
ΘL(xL(w), w). Given that ΘL is strictly increasing in x and ΘP is strictly decreasing in x and ΘP
and ΘL cross only once in a (x, θ) plane, we conclude that x < xL(w) for any p > pθ(w). Thus,
θ = ΘL(x,w) < ΘL(xL(w), w) = θ∗ for any p > pθ(w). To simplify the exposition, we extend the
definition of pθ by pθ(w) = 0 for all w ≥ wL. To summarize, θ < θ∗ if and only if p > pθ(w) for any
w > 0.
Second part: condition such that x < x∗. We define the function px : (0,+∞)→ (0,+∞) by
px(w) =
χ
1− χ ·
[
(1 + τ(x∗))1−
h · fˆ(ΘL(x∗, w)) ·
α · µ
w
] 1

.
By definition, ΘP (x∗, px(w), w) = ΘL(x∗, w); thus, x∗ is the equilibrium product market tightness
when the value of the real wage is w and the value of the price is px(w). We define the auxiliary
function Z : (0,+∞)→ (0,+∞) by
Z(w) = f(x∗) · a · α · ns(ΘL(x∗, w)).
Given that ΘL(x∗, w∗) = θ∗ and ΘL is strictly increasing in w, ΘL(x∗, w) > θ∗ if and only if w > w∗.
Using Lemma 2 and the fact that ΘL is strictly increasing in w, we infer that Z is strictly increasing
for w ∈ (0, w∗) and strictly decreasing for w ∈ (w∗,+∞). Given the definition of ΘL, we infer that
Z(w) = h · w · fˆ(ΘL(x∗, w)) and therefore that
px(w) =
χ
1− χ ·
[
(1 + τ(x∗))1−
Z(w)
· α · µ
] 1

.
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0 xm
✓m
✓⇤
⇥L(x,wL)
⇥L(x,w < wL)
xL(w)
⇥P (x, p✓(w), w)
⇥P (x, p > p✓(w), w)
✓
x
(a) Condition such that θ < θ∗
0 
0 xm
✓m
✓⇤
✓
x x⇤
⇥P (x, px(w), w)
⇥P (x, p⇤, w⇤)
⇥L(x,w⇤)
⇥L(x,w > w⇤)
⇥P (x, p > px(w), w)
(b) Condition such that x < x∗
Figure A1: Illustration of the proof of Proposition 6
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The properties of Z imply that the function px strictly decreasing for w ∈ (0, w∗) and strictly increas-
ing for w ∈ (w∗,+∞) and px(w∗) = p∗.
Let θ denote equilibrium labor market tightness and x denote equilibrium product market tight-
ness. Consider w ∈ (0,+∞). For any p > px(w), ΘP (x∗, p, w) < ΘP (x∗, px(w), w) = ΘL(x∗, w).
Given that ΘL is strictly increasing in x and ΘP is strictly decreasing in x and ΘP and ΘL cross only
once in a (x, θ) plane, we conclude that x < x∗ for any p > px(w). To summarize, x < x∗ if and only
if p > px(w) for any w > 0.
B Equilibrium Concept
This appendix provides more details about our equilibrium concept. We draw a parallel between
our concept and the Walrasian equilibrium. Following Walrasian theory, we make the institutional
assumption that a price, p, and a market tightness, x, are posted on the market for services, and we
make the behavioral assumption that buyers and sellers of services take price and tightness as given.
The assumption is that buyers and sellers are small relative to the size of the market so that they
regard market tightness and price as unaffected by their own actions. Market tightness is the ratio of
aggregate buying effort to aggregate selling effort; thus, it seems reasonable for buyers and sellers
to take it as given if they are small relative to the size of the market. The issue is more complicated
for the price since buyer and seller could bargain over the price once they are matched, implying that
they have some control over the price. However, the actual transaction price has no influence on the
production and search decisions once a match is realized; what matters is the price that buyers and
sellers expect to trade at. Since the transaction price depends on the other party and possibly other
factors (for instance, custom, social norms, other buyers, and other sellers), we assume that each party
takes the expected transaction price as given.
We define a general equilibrium as follows:
DEFINITION A1. A general equilibrium is a price p, market tightness x, aggregate consumption of
services c, aggregate sales of services s, a collection of visits {v(i), i ∈ [0, 1]}, and a collection of
capacities {y(j), j ∈ [0, 1]} such that
(1) Taking x and p as given, buyer i ∈ [0, 1] chooses the number of visits v(i) to maximize her utility
subject to her budget constraint and to the constraint imposed by matching frictions: c(i) =
v(i) · q(x)/(1 + τ(x)), where c(i) is consumption of buyer i.
(2) Taking x and p as given, seller j ∈ [0, 1] chooses the capacity y(j) to maximize her utility subject
to the constraint imposed by matching frictions: s(j) = y(j) ·f(x), where s(j) is sales of seller j.
(3) The actual labor market tightness is x:
x =
∫ 1
0
v(i)di∫ 1
0
y(j)dj
.
(4) The price p is pairwise Pareto efficient in all buyer-seller matches.
(5) Aggregate consumption satisfies c =
∫ 1
0
c(i)di and aggregate sales satisfy s =
∫ 1
0
s(j)dj.
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As in a Walrasian equilibrium, our equilibrium concept imposes that buyers and sellers behave
optimally given the quoted price and tightness. A key difference between the two equilibrium concepts
is that in a Walrasian equilibrium, buyers and sellers decide the quantity that they desire to buy or sell
whereas in our equilibrium, buyers and sellers decide the buying effort and selling effort that they
desire to exert, and these efforts lead to a trade with a probability determined by the market tightness.
Consumers decide how many sellers of services to visit, knowing that each visits lead to a purchase
with probability q(x); workers decide how many units of services to offer for sale, knowing that each
unit is sold with probability f(x).
In a Walrasian equilibrium, the condition that sellers and buyers behave optimally is comple-
mented by a market-clearing condition: at the quoted price, the quantity that buyers desire to buy
equals the quantity that sellers desire to sell. It is possible to reformulate this condition as a consis-
tency requirement: given that sellers and buyers expect to be able to trade with probability one, it must
be that anybody desiring to trade is able to trade in equilibrium; this condition can only be fulfilled
if the market clears. Condition (3) is the equivalent to this consistency requirement in presence of
matching frictions. Once buyers and sellers have chosen {v(i), i ∈ [0, 1]} and {y(j), j ∈ [0, 1]}, the
number of trades is given by[(∫
v(i)di
)−η
+
(∫
y(j)dj
)−η]−1η
=
(∫
y(j)dj
)
·f
(∫
v(i)di∫
y(j)dj
)
=
(∫
v(i)di
)
·q
(∫
v(i)di∫
y(j)dj
)
.
These equalities imply that the selling probability faced by sellers is f
(∫
v(i)di/
∫
y(j)dj
)
and the
buying probability faced by buyers is q
(∫
v(i)di/
∫
y(j)dj
)
. Both probabilities do not have to be
equal to the probabilities on which sellers and buyers based their calculations, f(x) and q(x). In
equilibrium, we impose the consistency requirement that these probabilities match, or equivalently,
that the posted tightness equals the actual tightness,
∫
v(i)di/
∫
y(j)dj.
The last substantial equilibrium condition is that the price is pairwise Pareto efficient in all buyer-
seller matches. In Walrasian theory, the condition that no mutually advantageous trades between two
agents are available impose that the probability to trade is one. This is because without a matching
function, buyers who do not trade with anybody but would like to trade can come together on the
market place. If excess supply or demand existed at the market price, buyers or sellers could initiate
new trades at a different price until all opportunities for pairwise improvement are exhausted. For
example, if there is excess demand for a good, a buyer who is not receiving as much of the good
as she desires could offer a slightly higher price and get sellers to sell the good to her first, making
both buyer and seller better off. In our theory, this condition only constrains the price to allocate
to buyer and seller a positive share of the surplus arising from the seller-buyer match. This surplus
arises because workers remain idle and do not sell one unit of service if the match is broken, and also
because buyer’s matching costs are sunk at the time of matching.
Under these equilibrium conditions, the market for nonproduced good necessarily clears:
∫ 1
0
m(i)di =
µ, where m(i) is consumption of nonproduced good by buyer i. The reason is that the budget con-
straints of all consumers are satisfied, and that sales equal purchases through the matching process.
52
C Equilibrium Under Cobb-Douglas Utility Function
We determine conditions such that an equilibrium with positive consumption exists when consumers
have Cobb-Douglas utility function (which is a CES utility function with → 1). We state and prove
a proposition for the model of Section 2, and another one for the model of Section 3.
PROPOSITION A3. Consider the model of Section 2. Assume that consumers have a Cobb-Douglas
utility function, cχ ·m1−χ. Define
pm ≡ χ
1− χ ·
µ
y
· (1− ρη)− 1η .
There are two cases:
(i) If p ≤ pm, the only short-run equilibrium is (xm, 0).
(ii) If p > pm, one short-run equilibrium is (xm, 0) and one short-run equilibrium is (x, c) where x
satisfies
f(x) · y = χ
1− χ ·
µ
p
(A8)
and c = cs(x). In particular, x ∈ (0, xm) and c > 0.
Proof. We are looking for a tightness x ∈ [0, xm] that satisfies cs(x) = cd(x, p) or
1
1 + τ(x)
·
(
f(x) · y − χ
1− χ ·
µ
p
)
= 0.
1/ (1 + τ(xm)) = 0 by definition of xm. Hence, (x, c) = (xm, cs(xm)) = (xm, 0) is always an
equilibrium. Furthermore, 1/ (1 + τ(x)) > 0 for x < xm so any other equilibrium tightness must
satisfy (A8). Since f is strictly increasing and f(0) = 0, there is a unique x ∈ (0, xm) that satisfies
this condition if and only if
f(xm) = (1− ρη) 1η > χ
1− χ ·
µ
p · y . (A9)
Let us summarize the results. If (A9) is not satisfied, (xm, 0) is the unique equilibrium. If (A9) is
satisfied, there are two equilibria: (xm, 0) and (x, c) where x satisfies (A8) and c = cs(x).
In the interior equilibrium (x, c), demand is higher than supply when tightness is below x (and
conversely). Hence, if tightness is below equilibrium, demand is above supply, leading to an increase
in tightness (and conversely). In contrast, in the corner equilibrium (xm, 0), demand is lower than
supply when tightness is below xm. Loosely speaking, the interior equilibrium is stable while the
corner equilibrium is unstable. Hence, the main text focuses solely on the interior equilibrium.
PROPOSITION A4. Consider the model of Section 3. Assume that consumers have a Cobb-Douglas
utility function, cχ ·m1−χ. Define
Wm ≡ α · χ
1− χ · µ ·
(
1− ρˆηˆ) 1ηˆ .
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Define Θ : [Wm,+∞) → [0, θm) by Θ(W ) = fˆ−1 (α · [χ/ (1− χ)] · (µ/W )). Finally, define pm :
[Wm,+∞)→ [0,+∞) by
pm(W ) =
χ
1− χ ·
µ
a
· (1− ρη)− 1η · [ns(Θ(W ))]−α .
There are two cases:
(i) If p · w ≤ Wm or p ≤ pm(p · w), there are two short-run general equilibria: the two equilibria
with zero consumption of Proposition A2.
(ii) If p ·w > Wm and p > pm(p ·w), there are three short-run general equilibria: the two equilibria
with zero consumption of Proposition A2 and (x, θ, n, c) where (θ, x) solve
α · χ
1− χ · µ = p · w · fˆ(θ) (A10)
χ
1− χ · µ = p · f(x) · a · [n
s(θ)]α (A11)
and n = ns(θ) and c = cs(x, n).
Proof. In general equilibrium, (x, θ) satisfies the system (A4)–(A5).
First case: θ = θm or x = xm. As explained in the proof of Proposition A2, there are exactly two
general equilibria in that case: the two equilibria with zero consumption of Proposition A2. These
equilibria exist for any p > 0 and any w > 0.
Second case: θ < θm and x < xm. 1/(1 + τ(x)) > 0 and 1/(1 + τˆ(θ)) > 0 so we can rewrite (A4)
and (A5) as
w · fˆ(θ) = f(x) · a · α · [ns(θ)]α
f(x) · a · [ns(θ)]α = χ
1− χ ·
µ
p
.
The first equation is just (A2) and the second equation is just (A7) when  = 1, substituting ns(θ) =
h·fˆ(θ)/(1+ τˆ(θ)). We can recombine this system as (A10)–(A11). The system (A10)–(A11) does not
admit solutions for any p and w. As we are looking for θ < θm, we need fˆ(θ) < fˆ(θm) =
(
1− ρˆηˆ) 1ηˆ .
Equation (A10) therefore requires
p · w > α · χ
1− χ · µ ·
(
1− ρˆηˆ)− 1ηˆ ≡ Wm.
Since fˆ is strictly increasing from 0 to
(
1− ρˆηˆ) 1ηˆ for θ ∈ [0, θm), equation (A10) admits a unique
solution in [0, θm) if p · w > Wm. The function Θ defined in the proposition is the unique solution
to (A10) when p · w ∈ (Wm,+∞).
We turn to (A11). As we are looking for x < xm, we also need f(x) < f(xm) = (1− ρη) 1η .
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Equation (A11) therefore requires
p >
χ
1− χ ·
µ
a
· (1− ρη)− 1η · [ns(Θ(p · w))]−α ≡ pm(p · w).
We replaced θ by Θ(p · w) in (A11) since we have already solved (A10) for θ. Since f is strictly
increasing from 0 to (1− ρη) 1η for x ∈ [0, xm), equation (A11) admits a unique solution in [0, xm) if
p > pm(p · w).
D Reducing Unemployment by Increasing Wages
To formalize the discussion of Section 3.6, we state and prove two propositions that apply to the model
with customer relationships and inequality. The first proposition describes the set of parameters such
that a general equilibrium exists. The second proposition establishes conditions such that a wage
increase leads to a reduction in unemployment.
PROPOSITION A5. Assume that consumers have Cobb-Douglas utility function, cχ ·m1−χ. Assume
that there are no matching costs: ρ = ρˆ = 0. Assume that the customer base is κ > 0. Normalize
technology to a = 1 and price to p = 1. Then equilibrium employment solves
α
w
· [K2 − κ] = K1 · n− κ · n1−α
where the constants K1 and K2 are defined by
K1 ≡
∑
g(1− χg) · [α ·$g + (1− α) · σg]∑
g(1− χg) · σg
(A12)
K2 ≡
∑
g µg · χg∑
g(1− χg) · σg
. (A13)
In addition, define the following constants: B1 ≡ κ−1/α ·(κ−K2)/(1−K1),B2 ≡ (κ−K2)/(κ−K1),
andB3 ≡ (K1/K2)
1−α
α . There are several possible cases in which a general equilibrium with positive
tightnesses exists:
(i) if K1 < κ, K2 < κ, and K1 < K2, for any wage such that (w/α) ∈ [B1, B2];
(ii) if K1 < 1, K2 < κ, and K1 > K2, for any wage such that (w/α) ∈ [B1, B3];
(iii) if K1 < 1, κ < K2, and K1 > K2, for any wage such that (w/α) ∈ [B2, B3];
(iv) if 1 < K1, κ < K2, and K1 > K2, for any wage such that (w/α) ∈ [B2,min {B1, B3}];
In all these cases, the general equilibrium with positive tightnesses is unique.
Proof. Assume that ρ = ρˆ = 0, a = 1, and p = 1. In this case, τ(x) = τˆ(θ) = 0. Also assume that
κ > 0. A key general-equilibrium condition is that cd(n,w) = cs(x, n). Using the expressions for
cs(x, n) and cd(n,w) obtained in Section 3.6, we obtain∑
g µg · χg∑
g(1− χg) · σg
+
∑
g χg · ($g − σg)∑
g(1− χg) · σg
· w · n = κ · (1− f(x)) + f(x) · nα.
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Another general equilibrium condition is that n = nd(θ, x, w), which implies α · f(x) = w · n1−α.
Combining these two conditions, we obtain
α ·
∑
g µg · χg∑
g(1− χg) · σg
= α · κ− κ · w · n1−α +
[
1− α ·
∑
g χg · ($g − σg)∑
g(1− χg) · σg
]
· w · n.
Using the constants defined by (A12) and (A13), this equation simplifies to
α
w
· (K2 − κ) = K1 · n− κ · n1−α. (A14)
Define the polynomial
P (z) = K1 · z 11−α − κ · z + α
w
· (κ−K2)
Solving the general equilibrium of the model is equivalent to solving P (z) = 0 and imposing that the
root z∗ of P satisfies z∗ ∈
[
κ
1−α
α ,min {1, α/w}
]
. Once we have found z∗, the general equilibrium
(n, x, θ, c) is given by n = (z∗)
1
1−α , x = f−1 (z∗ · w/α), θ = fˆ−1
(
(z∗)
1
1−α
)
, and c = κ+(z∗ · w/α) ·(
(z∗)
α
1−α − κ
)
. The three conditions on z∗ ensure that we can construct x, θ, and c:
• z∗ ≥ κ 1−αα ensures that c ≥ κ;
• z∗ < 1 ensures that we can construct θ given that fˆ(θ) ∈ [0, 1];
• z∗ < α/w ensures that we can construct x given that f(x) ∈ [0, 1].
We first show that P (z) is strictly increasing for z ∈ [κ 1−αα ,+∞).
P ′(z) =
K1
1− α · z
α
1−α − κ.
Hence,
P ′(κ
1−α
α ) =
[
K1
1− α − 1
]
· κ.
As
K1 =
∑
g(1− χg) · [α ·$g + (1− α) · σg]∑
g(1− χg) · σg
≥
∑
g(1− χg) · [(1− α) · σg]∑
g(1− χg) · σg
= 1− α,
K1/(1− α) ≥ 1 and P ′(κ 1−αα ) ≥ 0. Since P ′ is strictly increasing for z ≥ 0, we infer that P ′(z) > 0
for z > κ
1−α
α . As a conclusion, P is strictly increasing for z ∈ [κ 1−αα ,+∞) and P has at most one
root on [κ
1−α
α ,+∞).
The system of equations has a solution if and only if P has a root in the interval
[
κ
1−α
α ,min {1, α/w}
]
.
As a function of the parameters K1, K2, and κ, we determine for which wages such a root exists. For
such a root to exist, it is necessary and sufficient that P (κ
1−α
α ) < 0 and min {P (1), P (α/w)} > 0.
The first condition is that P (κ
1−α
α ) < 0, which is equivalent to
w
α
· (K1 − 1) < (K2 − κ) · κ− 1α .
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Define B1 ≡ κ−1/α · (κ−K2)/(1−K1). There are three cases:
• if K1 < 1, then we need w/α > B1;
• if K1 = 1, then any wage works as long as K2 > κ;
• if K1 > 1, then we need w/α < B1.
The next necessary condition is that P (1) > 0, which is equivalent to
w
α
· (K1 − κ) > (K2 − κ).
Define B2 ≡ (κ−K2)/(κ−K1). There are three cases:
• if K1 < κ, then we need w/α < B2;
• if K1 = κ, then any wage works as long as K2 < κ;
• if K1 > κ, then we need w/α > B2.
The last necessary condition is that P (α/w) > 0, which is equivalent to
K1 ·
(α
w
) α
1−α
> K2.
Define B3 ≡ (K1/K2)
1−α
α . Then we need w/α < B3 for any K1 > 0 and K2 > 0.
We now need to consider all the possible combinations of (K1, K2) to determine whether there
exists a wage satisfying these three conditions.
1. K2 < K1 < κ: We need w/α > B1, w/α < B2, and w/α < B3. K2 < K1 so B3 > 1 and
B2 > 1. However, when w/α > 1, P (1) > P (α/w) so the constraint w/α < B2 is not binding.
Hence, we only need to impose B1 < w/α < B3.
2. K1 < K2 < κ: We need w/α > B1, w/α < B2, and w/α < B3. K1 < K2 so B3 < 1 so
w/α < 1 so P (1) < P (α/w) so the constraint w/α < B3 is not binding. Hence, we only need
to impose B1 < w/α < B2.
3. K1 < κ and K2 > κ: We need w/α > B1, w/α < B2, and w/α < B3. But B2 < 0. Therefore,
no such w/α exists.
4. K1 ∈ (κ, 1) and K2 < κ: We need w/α > B1, w/α > B2, and w/α < B3. But B2 < 0 so the
constraint w/α > B2 is always satisfied. Hence, we only need to impose B1 < w/α < B3.
5. K1 ∈ (κ, 1) and K2 ∈ (κ, 1) and K2 < K1: We need w/α > B1, w/α > B2, and w/α < B3.
But B1 < 0 so the constraint w/α > B1 is always satisfied. Hence, we only need to impose
B2 < w/α < B3.
6. K1 ∈ (κ, 1) and K2 > K1: We need w/α > B1, w/α > B2, and w/α < B3. But B2 > 1 and
B3 < 1. Therefore, no such w/α exists.
7. K1 > 1 and K2 < κ: We need w/α < B1, w/α > B2, and w/α < B3. But B1 < 0. Therefore,
no such w/α exists.
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8. K1 > 1 and K2 ∈ (κ,K1): We need w/α < B1, w/α > B2, and w/α < B3.
9. K1 > 1 and K2 > K1: We need w/α < B1, w/α > B2, and w/α < B3. But B2 > 1 and
B3 < 1. Therefore, no such w/α exists.
Only Cases 1, 2, 4, 5, and 8 offer a solution.
PROPOSITION A6. In all general equilibria such thatK2 < κ, a wage increase leads to a reduction
in unemployment, as well as an increase in employment, consumption, product market tightness, and
labor market tightness.
Proof. Consider a general equilibrium with K2 < κ. Using the notations of the proof of Proposition
6, a general equilibrium characterized by z∗ satisfies P (z∗) = 0. We perform a comparative-statics
exercise with respect to w:
∂P
∂w
+
∂P
∂z
· dz
∗
dw
= 0.
Since K2 < κ,
∂P
∂w
= α · (K2 − κ) · 1
w2
< 0.
Furthermore, since z∗ > κ
1−α
α and K1 ≥ 1− α,
∂P
∂z
=
K1
1− α · z
α
1−α − κ ≥ z α1−α − κ >
(
κ
1−α
α
) α
1−α − κ = 0.
We conclude that dz∗/dw > 0. All the results listed in the proposition follow given the relationship
between z∗ and the equilibrium variables described in the proof of Proposition 6.
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